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Abstract
This dissertation analyzes corporate-community conflicts around extractive
industries in Guatemala with the purpose of better understanding how environmental
struggles emerge and take shape. The study uses environmental governance as a
framework to analyze the processes, institutions, actors and discourses that shape the
conditions of possibility of political action and mobilization in environmental struggles.
The dissertation argues that to understand the conditions of possibility of political action
and mobilization in environmental struggles we must study the interplay between
political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below,’ which are seen as dialectically
interrelated, with dynamic and contested interactions between actors within and between
scales.
Environmental struggles are understood as part of emergent forms of scalar
politics wherein different actors struggle to (re)consolidate power and authority in the
hands of competing groups. The complex ways in which corporate-elite-governmentmilitary networks shape political actions in environmental conflicts intersects with the
strategies of grassroots movements, who themselves are engaged in multi-scalar
contentious politics. Spatialities shape the conditions of possibility for political action.
They matter for the imaginaries, material practices and emergent trajectories of
environmental struggles. By examining the shifting spatialities of political actions we can
ii

reveal the articulations of emergent power relations and make visible some of the power
geometries in environmental struggles.
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Chapter One: Environmental governance, extractive industries and struggles
for environmental justice in Guatemala
1. Introduction
I did not know that I would end up working in Guatemala when I started the PhD
program at the Department of Geography and the Environment at the University of
Denver. My master’s thesis had focused on issues relating to changing land tenure in
coastal Nicaragua and I had always thought I would continue working in Nicaragua, at
least in some capacity. I was headed to Nicaragua for a return visit in November 2014
and decided to make a quick stop in Guatemala on the way.
I did not know much about the history of Guatemala before I got there. I knew
that the country had experienced a horrific 36-year long war, which had produced some
of Latin America’s most terrible instances of state terror that culminated in acts of
genocide. I would later find out that counterinsurgency warfare saw more than 200,000
people murdered during the war, the vast majority of which were non-combatant
indigenous Maya. Another 50,000 people were disappeared, their whereabouts unknown
and their bodies buried in clandestine graves throughout the country.
I also knew that conflicts relating to extractive industries and hydropower
development were spreading throughout the country, and that these conflicts were
becoming increasingly violent. The civil war ended with the signing of the Peace Accords
in 1996 during a period when the government negotiated different free trade agreement
1

and changed legislation to attract foreign investment, and extractive industries were one
of the economic sectors strongly promoted by the government.
People in post-war societies are marked for a long time by their experiences with
terror and death, but also, many governing practices that emerge during civil wars are
difficult to eradicate. Environmental struggles in Guatemala are historically contingent,
embedded in a post-war context and must be understood against this backdrop. As such,
one of the things I pay particular attention to in my dissertation is how the civil war
shapes conflicts surrounding extractive industries.
Before that first trip to Guatemala I had learned about an unfolding situation
surrounding a Canadian mining project in southeastern Guatemala, where only the year
before my arrival the conflict had reached a boiling point. Communities affected by the
mining project had started to organize against the mine a few years earlier, frustrated with
lack of transparency and their exclusion form decision-making processes, and worried
about the potential environmental impacts of the mine. The Canadian company had
become increasingly unhappy with local opposition to the mine and demanded that the
government take action to protect the company’s investments.
In May 2013, then President, Otto Perez Molina declared a ‘state of siege’ in the
areas surrounding the mine, deploying thousands of troops and police to the area. The
repression was harsh and the criminalization that would follow effective. Anti-mining
movement leaders had arrest warrants issued against them and soldiers and police officers
raided activists’ homes. Many were arrested, while others fled into hiding. Perez Molina,
a former special-ops army general, justified the state of siege – which can be likened to
martial law – on grounds of terrorism and drug trafficking threats.
2

The logic of the civil war and the counterinsurgency warfare that characterized it,
so deeply embedded within the Guatemalan state, continue to shape the ways in which
the government and industry react to contentious environmental politics, often by
portraying activists in the same ways as adversaries during the war, justifying corporate
counterinsurgency, repression and criminalization against them.
Examining how government, corporations and elites react to opposition ‘from
below’ against extractive industries became a main focus of my dissertation. However, I
also observed that the ways in which grassroots movements mobilize against extractive
projects influences responses ‘from above.’ In my dissertation, I argue that to understand
political action in environmental struggles we must study the interplay between political
actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below,’ which I see as dynamic and contested
interactions between actors within and between scales. Environmental struggles are part
of emergent forms of politics where different actors struggles to consolidate power and
authority in the hands of competing groups in and through the environment.
This then was the context in which I decided to visit the areas surrounding the
mine for the first time. Early one morning I set out to meet with members of the antimining movement in the Departments of Santa Rosa and Jalapa. I met with members of
the ‘Parliament of the Xinka People of Guatemala’, who despite their right to prior
consultation as established by the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples Convention number 169, which Guatemala ratified in 1996, were
never consulted prior to the installment of the mine. This would later result in the
suspension of the mine’s exploitation license when Guatemalan courts recognized the
Xinka peoples right to consultation as established by the Convention.
3

Later I would also meet people who had escaped on foot through the mountains
when soldiers and police came to arrest them during the state of siege, others who had
been forewarned by neighbors and managed to escape but nonetheless had their homes
raided and their children and families terrorized. I met people who had been kidnapped,
who had been shot by the mine’s private security, others who had been arbitrarily
arrested and jailed for months without trial, others who had lost their children. Families
and neighbors no longer speaking to each other because some were pro-mining while
others were anti-mining.
That same day I also went to San Rafael Las Flores, where the mine itself is
located. However, once in San Rafael, I was asked if I’d be willing to go to the next
town, Mataquescuintla or Colís as the locals know it, because it was safer and it would be
easier to talk there. Colís, unlike San Rafael, had declared itself as against mining, having
successfully carried out a community referendum on mining, which the Guatemalan High
Court had recognized as legally binding in 2013 – the first time ever in Guatemalan
history.
Driving into Colís we saw big signs saying ‘No a la minería!’ – ‘No to mining’
and even though there were soldiers on patrol throughout the small city the atmosphere
already felt a little lighter than in San Rafael. The Colíseños told me the story of how
they had organized a municipal referendum on the mining project and of the pushback
they had experienced from the mining industry and the government, and the following
state of siege. They explained that in Colís they had the support of their mayor, whereas
in San Rafael Las Flores the mayor, who was pro-mining, had refused to authorize a
municipal referendum.
4

The issue of the community referendums and how anti-mining activists
increasingly deploy legal strategies as part of their political and social struggles became
another focus of my dissertation. In Guatemala, anti-mining activists increasingly use
‘the law’ to expand the political spaces available to them for transformative politics.
Different types of community referendums have become one of the most common tools
for resisting mining. Through these mechanisms, grassroots movements have
increasingly been able to assert the rights of mining-affected communities and indigenous
peoples to self-determination in environmental decision-making and natural resource
management.
I was moved by the sense of urgency of the people I met on this initial visit to
Guatemala: ‘the world needs to know about this’ they said. Their resilience, their hope,
and their fighting spirit inspired me. In particular, I was inspired by their willingness to
defy all odds against an insurmountably strong industry and a State with a long history of
rural repression. And so it was that I came to fall in love with Guatemala. I left
Guatemala that December 2014 knowing without a doubt that I would be back and that
my doctoral research would focus on the environmental struggles emerging in response to
extractive industries.
Five years later, I remain inspired as ever by the people of Guatemala and by their
tenacity. I am inspired by the innovative ways in which grassroots actors have been able
to pry open the political spaces they have historically been excluded from. Through their
efforts they are increasingly able to obtain recognition and assert the rights of affected
communities to self-determination in environmental decision-making processes. In doing
so, they attempt to push open new spaces for participation, recognition and distribution in
5

order to access environmental justice. They increasingly unsettle the legitimacy of
dominant ideas about development and human-environment relations, and in small ways,
they subvert hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles.
2. Background and context
Since the early 2000s, environmental conflicts stemming from the expansion of
extractive industries have proliferated throughout Guatemala. This expansion relates to
changes in the global geography of resource extraction, which are the result of the greatly
expanding metabolism of societies consuming ever more energy and material resources
(Martínez-Alier, 2002). The liberalization of economic policies, natural resource laws
and investment codes, the financialization of many commodity markets, and historically
low domestic interest rates, coupled with a decade of high commodity prices,
deregulation and technological innovations have allowed corporations to advance the
commodity frontier, moving ever greater quantities of soil and water (Bridge, 2004).
Industry technological advances have also made natural resources accessible that were
previously not economically viable (Mudd, 2007). Companies go deeper and farther into
more ecologically and often socially vulnerable areas to extract resources. Often, these
areas are inhabited communities, many of them indigenous, who most suffer the burdens
of environmental degradation and pollution, and lack of access to basic resources due to
the unequal distribution of power and income, and social inequalities of ethnicity, social
class, caste and gender (Conde, 2017). While economic growth and the increasing social
metabolism of society, coupled with neoliberal reforms are some of the reasons behind
the expansion of the resource extraction, what causes conflicts to emerge are the socio6

environmental impacts on land, water and livelihoods coupled with the exclusion of
affected communities from decision-making processes (Conde, 2017; Conde & Le Billon,
2017).
In Guatemala, unprecedented environmental struggles led by strong grassroots
movements have emerged in response to the expansion of extractive industries. These
grassroots movements include some of the most marginalized social groups in Guatemala
– indigenous people and the rural poor. Issues of water scarcity, pollution and loss of
farmland often lie at the core of these conflicts. Resistance to extractive industries
addresses a range of interrelated concerns, including claims to political autonomy; the
rights to land and territory; the unjust burden of environmental risk and degradation; the
politics of livelihoods; and cultural survival. More broadly, these movements question
ideas and visions of development that they feel dispossess and exclude them, and express
discontent over the unequal distribution of socio-environmental benefits and burdens
stemming from extractive projects (Hall et al., 2015). The people involved in these
struggles use a wide array of strategies and tactics to resist extractive projects. They
organize community referendums, stage demonstrations and set up blockades. They
mobilize transnational activist networks and collaborate with international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious groups. Activists also increasingly use
legal discourses and mechanisms as part of their political and social struggles, using ‘the
law’ to expand the political spaces available to them for transformative politics.
Social and environmental injustices are rampant in Guatemala, and environmental
struggles take place in a post-war context characterized by racism, fragile justice,
pervasive impunity and great structural inequality. Those who engage in resistance
7

against extractive projects are faced with an unsettling climate of hostility and violence,
and experience repression and criminalization aimed at undermining their activism, and
reports indicate that killings of environmental activists are on the rise (Global Witness,
2017).
3. Conceptualizing environmental struggles in Guatemala
Environmental struggles in Guatemala are historically contingent, embedded in a
post-war context and must be understood against this backdrop. Guatemala’s thirty-six
year long civil war, which lasted from 1960 to 1996, produced some of Latin America’s
most terrible instances of state terror that culminated in acts of genocide.
Counterinsurgency warfare saw more than 200,000 people murdered during the war, the
vast majority of which were non-combatant indigenous Maya. Another 50,000 people
were disappeared, their whereabouts unknown and their bodies buried in clandestine
graves throughout the country (Brett, 2016; CEH, 2012; ODAH, 1998). The widespread
operationalization of disappearances became a signature tactic of the Guatemalan military
and was used to terrorize, punish and silence the civilian population. The signing of the
Peace Accords in 1996, which marked the end of the war, did little to address many of
the root causes of the civil war, such as inequality, highly skewed land distribution,
deeply rooted racism and the exclusion of the indigenous population from meaningful
civil and political participation (Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen, and Bull, forthcoming).
Drawing inspiration from the work of Brett (2016) and Sundberg (2008), I argue that in
order to understand contemporary environmental struggles in Guatemala two specific
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factors must be taken into account: 1) the logic counterinsurgency and 2) the logic of
racism, and how these factors shape the conditions of political action and mobilization.
3.1. The logic of counterinsurgency
Guatemala’s state crafting project was one that combined democracy with anticommunist counterinsurgency, which built on long-evolving patterns of rural repression
(Grandin, 2011). In the words of General Gramajo, quoted by Jennifer Schirmer (1998, p.
1): “in Guatemala, a democracy was born out of the womb of a counterinsurgency
campaign.” To this day counterinsurgency structures remain incorporated into the very
heart of the Guatemalan state and continue to condition individual and collective actions.
A main factor driving the political violence that culminated in the mass atrocities
committed against indigenous non-combatants was the counterinsurgency objective of
‘draining the bowl to kill the fish’ (Brett, 2016; Sanford, 2003; Schirmer, 1998).
Particularly under President Lucas García and de facto president General Efraín Ríos
Montt, between 1981 and 1983, a ‘scorched earth’ campaign of extraordinary brutality
was waged, including eradicating entire communities, systematic massacres against
indigenous populations, homicides, torture, mass public rape and forced sterilization, the
burning of crops and the killings of livestock to ‘starve out’ the insurgents (Brett, 2016, p.
57).
Despite the official disappearance of the counterinsurgency state,
counterinsurgency has become common sense among large factions of Guatemalans, for
whom the lack of empathy forwards the victims of state terror has become normalized
(Flores, 2017). The logic of counterinsurgency, so deeply embedded within the
Guatemalan state, shapes the way in which the government and elites react to contentious
9

environmental politics, often by portraying activists in the same ways as adversaries
during the war, justifying corporate counterinsurgency, repression and criminalization
against them, issues which are discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation.
3.2. The logic of racism
Though the conflict in Guatemala reflected the anti-communist logic of the
region’s Cold War, it was also shaped by the longer-term logic of embedded racism that
served to organize unequal socio-spatial relations in colonial and postcolonial Guatemala
(Brett, 2016; Casaús Arzú, 2010). As the counterinsurgency state sought to exterminate
the guerrilla’s support base, which was allegedly situated within indigenous and peasant
communities, it simultaneously sought to annihilate all vestiges of indigenous selfhood
(Brett, 2016, p. 2).
A wealth of research highlights the ways in which the ideology of racism is a
central axis of national life in Guatemala (Brett, 2016; Casaús Arzú, 2010; Nelson, 1999,
2015; Sundberg, 2008). Systems of hierarchical racialization were central to colonial rule
(Quijano, 2000), and Spanish colonial policies and administrative legacies left an
enduring imprint on governance, cultural practice, and human-environment relations in
Guatemala (Sundberg, 2008, p. 569). Although the European colonists encountered
diverse groups of people with differing languages, economies and governance structures,
the conquest led to a process of social homogenization, creating the unified categories of
“Spaniards” and “Indios” where none had previously existed (Quijano, 2000). A third
group was soon added to the mix: “Negros” made up of African slaves and their
descendants. Not only did the colonial legal system divide people into racial categories, it
also defined their differing rights and responsibilities accordingly, including what jobs
10

they were eligible for, whether they could pursue formal education, where they could
live, and whether or not they had access to natural resources. Racial thinking then
informed the ways in which the new Latin American republics codified citizenship, and
racial hierarchies came to form the structures of the postcolonial social order and the
modern state (Sundberg, 2008, p. 571).
Sundberg (2008) argues that while complex and fluid systems of racial
categorization emerged in the colonial era to describe the many outcomes of racial
mixing, Europeanness/whiteness formed the core of such systems. In ‘postcolonial’ Latin
America, hegemonic nation-building projects were organized around and privileged
whiteness. White supremacy and white privilege inform legal systems, and everyday
understandings of self and other, as well as the organization of space, place and
environmental formations.
3.3. Situating race in environmental struggles
In Guatemala, race1 has been a central factor in demarcating legal access to rights
and resources since the colonial era. While biological and cultural traits have long been
recognized as primary elements in delineating racial hierarchies in Latin America,
human-environment relations have been relatively neglected. Juanita Sundberg argues
that systems of racialization have drawn upon and come into being through
‘environmental formations’, that is, the historically contingent articulations between

1

I use the term race when referring to “a contingent historical phenomenon that has varied over
time and space” and racialization to refer to the “process of marking human differences
according to hierarchical discourses” (Appelbaum et al., 2003, p. 2). I understand racial
categories not as natural, but as a social construction, constituted in time and place (Cf. Sundberg,
2008).
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environmental imaginaries2, natural resource allocation and political economies.
According to Sundberg, analyzing how race articulates with environmental formations to
shape socio-spatial relations allows us to understand how environmental injustices are
organized, justified, but also reconfigured (2008, p. 569). An analytical lens such as
Sundberg’s provokes new questions about the ways in which exclusionary discourses and
practices work in and through the environment.
Processes of racialization articulate in and through ideas about nature and
appropriate natural resource practices and vice versa. They are rarely incidental to the
access and control of natural resources, predominant visions of appropriate land use,
exposure to environmental risk, access to environmental benefits (clean air, water, fertile
soils), and who counts in environmental policy making. Sundberg argues that
environmental justice, as an approach will be significantly enriched if we historicize
racialization in particular places. Understanding contemporary discourses and practices
depends upon analysing how actors draw from and reinterpret historically constructed
categories in the context of specific nation-building projects, legal frameworks, daily
discourses and practice, and environmental formations (Sundberg, 2008, p. 579).
Hegemonic visions of nature and appropriate human-environment relations are
shaped by, and in turn shape, racial hierarchies, which justify and fix unequal social
relations at multiple and intersecting scales (Sundberg, 2008). As such, natural resource
management practices, environmental governance and their regulatory and legal contexts
must be understood as racialized in ways that organize inequality. In Guatemala,
2

By environmental imaginaries, Sundberg (2008, p. 579) refers to ideas about nature and
appropriate human-environment relations, such as natural resource management and property
regimes.
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resistance against extractive projects is historically contingent and represents a struggle
for socio-spatial relations and forms of governance that are not based on the
normalization of racial inequality.
4. Environmental governance as an analytical framework
As an analytical framework environmental governance provides a tool for
examining the complex and multi-scalar institutional arrangements, social practices and
actors engaged in environmental decision making (Bridge & Perreault, 2009, p. 491). As
a concept environmental governance is more popular than precise. It has been deployed
in a myriad of ways to describe and to occasionally critique the institutional arrangements
of state, market and civil society through which decisions about environment and
resources are made. Bridge and Perreault (2009) have argued that environmental
governance articulates the economic with the political, shedding light on the relationships
between institutional capacities and social action. In doing so, the term problematizes
state-centric understandings of power and highlights the role of non-state actors – NGOs,
supra-national agencies, social movements, or private firms – in allocating,
administrating and regulating environments and resources. Governance occurs at multiple
scales that extend beyond those of formal institutions to include practices and norms
through which key categories – nature, environment, citizens and resources – are
contested, affirmed and reproduced.
In my understanding of environmental governance, I draw on the analytical
framework advanced by Bridge and Perrault and I adopt Bull and Aguilar-Støen’s (2015,
p. 5) definition of the term, which understands environmental governance as “the set of
13

mechanisms, formal and informal institutions and practices by which social order is
produced through controlling that which is related to the environment and natural
resources.” Such an understanding allows for a broader conceptualization of
environmental governance and looks past an environmental managerialism that is
unreflexive about the dynamics of power, divergence and conflict that inhere in the
process of managing resources and the environment, and which often masks competing
claims to, and about, the environment. In my view, environmental governance describes
an institutional arrangement that is not only a sociospatial configuration: it is also, and
fundamentally, a representation of – and resource for – political and economic power
operating on and through the control of the environment. Because the institutions,
organizations and relations of environmental governance are inherently power-laden,
analyses of environmental governance should aim to lay bare these power geometries,
and interrogate their origins and implications (Bridge & Perreault, 2009, p. 492).
5. Summary and structure of the dissertation
My dissertation, in its broadest sense, set out to better understand how
environmental struggles emerge and take shape. In particular, the dissertation analyzes
the processes, institutions, actors and discourses that shape the conditions of possibility
for political action and mobilization in environmental struggles. I argue that to
understand the conditions of possibility for political action in environmental struggles we
must study the interplay between political actions from above and from below, which is
what I have tried to do throughout the dissertation. I argue that environmental struggles
are part of emergent forms of politics wherein different actors struggle to consolidate
14

power and authority in the hands of competing groups. The complex ways in which
corporate-elite-government-military networks shape political actions in environmental
conflicts intersects with the strategies of grassroots movements, who themselves are
engaged in multi-scalar contentious politics.
To understand uneven development, unjust social relations, and environmental
conflicts, we must ground these processes historically and geographically by tracing the
historical processes, legal and institutional infrastructures, and socially implicated
assumptions and discourses that typically make unjust outcomes the rule rather than the
exception. By examining the shifting constellations of political actions from both above
and below we are able to reveal the articulations of emergent power relations and make
visible some of the power geometries in environmental struggles.
In addition to this introduction and a concluding chapter, which presents a
summary of the dissertation’s main arguments, the dissertation comprises of three articles
that are written as distinct manuscripts intended for publication in peer-reviewed journals.
The first article, “This is not a game”: Shaping political actions ‘from above’ in
environmental conflicts in Guatemala, is co-authored with Dr. Mariel Aguilar-Støen and
Dr. Benedicte Bull at the Centre for Development and the Environment at the University
of Oslo. This article examines how government, corporations and elites in Guatemala
shape decisions, practices, and interactions that influence political actions ‘from above’
in environmental conflicts. In the paper, we analyse how the private sector and the
government respond to opposition against extractive industries. Responses include tactics
and strategies that range from criminalisation and repression of activism to publicity
campaigns and lobbying. However, we observe that the ways in which social movements
15

resist also influence responses ‘from above,’ e.g. legal and technical contestations to
environmental and social standards, community referendums, civil disobedience etc. We
ask: 1) what types of resources are mobilised within government-corporate networks in
response to resistance to the advancement of extractive industries, and 2) how do tactics
used by social movements influence responses ‘from above'? We contend that the private
sector and government engage in practices that aim to undermine and suppress opposition
to extractive industries, and to make extractive operations politically and socially
legitimate. Activists are increasingly portrayed in the same way as adversaries during the
civil war, justifying counterinsurgency and repression against them, while paradoxically,
corporations claim commitment to international human rights standards, such as the
ILO’s Convention 169, and to engage in ‘community development’ and ‘social
responsibility.’
The second article, From the streets to the courts: Mobilizing the law to subvert
hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles, is co-authored with Dr. Mariel
Aguilar-Støen. This article examines the growing importance of law, legal institutions
and legal actors in environmental struggles. In doing so, we wish to get at the complex
and dynamic interweaving of law, space, politics and power in struggles for
environmental justice. More specifically, we analyze the ways in which grassroots actors
mobilize the law in attempts to subvert hegemonic norms and power relations in
environmental struggles. We argue that due to lack of adequate political spaces to
advance environmental struggles, activists have turned to the judiciary as a strategy to
expand their repertoires of contention. In doing so, they attempt to push open new spaces
for participation, recognition and distribution to access environmental justice.
16

The emerging legal strategies adopted by environmental activists in Guatemala
highlight how the many dynamic configurations of environmental struggles are related to
legal processes in lieu of political spaces. The legal cultures we observe in Guatemalan
environmental struggles raise important questions about the dialectics of resistance and
the law, and how these processes shape environmental governance, political participation
and contestation. Those who engage in resistance against extractive projects are faced
with a climate of hostility and violence, and experience repression and criminalization
aimed at undermining their activism. Despite this, we find that environmental struggles in
Guatemala reveal how grassroots mobilizations can - however modestly - subvert
hegemonic power relations in their struggles for environmental justice and transformative
politics.
The third article, Corporate community conflicts in Guatemala: Exploring private
sector perspectives on opposition to mining, explores the discourses of Guatemalan
business leaders and economic elites to analyze how the private sector explains and
understands corporate-community mining conflicts in the country. I analyse discourses
emerging from interviews with ‘the private sector’, wherein business leaders and
economic elites discussed their thoughts on socio-environmental conflicts and what they
see as the main challenges currently facing the extractive sector in Guatemala. In
focusing on private sector discourses my aim is to advance a better understanding of how
responses to mining opposition take shape, and the ways in which such discourses
contribute to establishing the conditions of possibility of political action in environmental
conflicts.
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The analysis presented in the dissertation draws on data gathered through
fieldwork in Guatemala between 2014-2017, using qualitative research methods such as
interviews, participant observation and document analysis. My analysis includes
perspectives from a wide range of diverse actors, including indigenous leaders,
environmental activists, and rural smallholding farmers involved in anti-extractive
movements, as well as legal advisors representing them, and allied organizations. I also
interviewed corporate representatives from transnational mining companies,
multinational conglomerates and agro-industrial organizations. I also interviewed leaders
of business associations and industrial business networks, board members of umbrella
associations promoting private sector interests, as well as powerful political and
economic elites. Between 2014-2017, forty-nine interviews were conducted. Participant
observation included visits to two different project sites; one a mineral mine, the other a
cement plant, as well as participation in private sector conferences, anti-extractive
demonstrations, meetings and public court hearings.
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Chapter Two: Methodological approach
The analysis presented in the dissertation draws on data gathered through
fieldwork in Guatemala between 2014-2017, using qualitative research methods such as
interviews, participant observation and document analysis. The decision to use qualitative
research was based on the findings of my exploratory research. My research process
began with exploratory research in Guatemala from 2014 until 2016. During four
separate trips I conducted interviews and was able to identify key issues, actors, and
processes that play a role in conflicts relating to natural resource extraction in the
country. Exploratory research between 2014 and 2016 played an important part in the
design of my study. The information gathered through exploratory research gave me an
overview and understanding of the corporate-community conflicts surrounding extractive
industries in Guatemala. This allowed for the progress of my research design to be
unfolding in nature, and letting empirical findings guide the development of the study’s
design. This does not imply an “anything goes” strategy. Qualitative research has an
inherent openness and flexibility that allows you to modify your design and focus during
the research to understand new discoveries and relationships (Maxwell, 2013).
Exploratory research enabled me to affirm that the type of approach I had in mind was
both appropriate and feasible. I confirmed that my Spanish was adequate to be able to
conduct interviews and that I would able to gain access to my desired participants, and
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that in-depth interviews and participant observation are an appropriate method for data
collection.
2.1 Data collection and exploratory research
To collect the information needed for my study I used in-depth interviewing,
participant observation, and analysis of texts and documents. I brought together the
information from these different sources in a process of triangulation in order to balance
the strengths and weaknesses of these different methods and the information they
produce. I collected information from a wide range of different actors, including
indigenous leaders, environmental activists, and rural smallholding farmers involved in
anti-extractive movements, as well as legal advisors representing them, and allied
organizations. I also interviewed corporate representatives from transnational mining
companies, multinational conglomerates and agro-industrial organizations. I also
interviewed leaders of business associations and industrial business networks, board
members of umbrella associations promoting private sector interests, as well as powerful
political and economic elites. Between 2014-2017, forty-nine interviews were conducted.
Participant observation included visits to two different project sites; one a mineral mine,
the other a cement plant, as well as participation in private sector conferences, antiextractive demonstrations, meetings and public court hearings.
Gaining access to the participants and settings that I used as sources of
information is a process that began with my ongoing exploratory fieldwork in 2014.
During exploratory research in 2015 I conducted in-depth interviews and participant
observation with participants from the anti-extractive movement. The preliminary
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findings from this exploratory research highlighted the need to study the role of the stateelite nexus in resource extraction to better understand the dynamics of violence that
surround these sectors. This is supported by research that indicates that not only is this
nexus understudied but also because the choices and actions of elites affect the
centralization of power in the state, the ability to extract resources from society, and the
establishment of a monopoly on legitimate force. These are all pre-requisites for the
emergence of a state that in turn can take on distributive functions and create a sense of
integrated community and citizenship (Bull, 2014). Gathering information from the
private sector, government officials, and the elites is important for several reasons. These
groups are currently understudied in Guatemala and what information exists about them
usually comes from secondary sources so that they tend to be blackboxed. Most existing
research considers them monolithic. Finally, these groups are important because they are
in position to formally or informally influence decisions and practices that have broad
societal impact (Bull, 2014).
I began the process of collecting information from the private sector and the elite
in Guatemala during the summer of 2016. Gaining access to these participants was not
without issue or unproblematic. Guatemala’s private sector and elite are very elusive and
recently, given the often-critical spotlight under which resource industries have come in
the country, they are very wary. However, through some good initial gatekeepers I was
able to get the ball rolling and I was able to begin to make headway with several key
informants. These were actors from the mining industry, from the agro-business industry,
the hydropower industry, as well as several association and groups that promote and
protect private sector interests. This initial access and relationship with this group of
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participants was important, and affirmed that it is possible to gain access to the private
sector and the elite.
2.2. Data analysis
In qualitative research, data analysis is a process of making meaning. It is a
creative process, not a mechanical one (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). My data analysis
strategy is one such of interpretation and I drew on my understanding of the context and
ongoing discussion both in Guatemala and beyond.
Analyzing qualitative data generally involves several stages. First, I began by
arranging and organizing my data so that I was able to make sense of it. Margaret
LeCompte and Jean Schensul (1999) call this the process of “tidying up.” I began by
listening to all recordings of my interviews and reorganizing my observation notes. I
made sure that all my taped interviews were transcribed verbatim and that my field notes
were together and complete. I made a comprehensive list of all the materials that I
gathered. Following this I began to immerse myself in my data and became familiar with
what I had gathered. I then read the interview transcripts, observation notes, and the
documents that I wanted to analyze. During this reading and listening, I wrote notes and
memos on what I see and heard in my data and developed tentative ideas about categories
and relationships. This was the beginning of determining patterns and regularities in my
data. Following this began the process of making sense of my data. The first steps of this
process were coding. In qualitative analysis, the goal of coding is to begin to focus on the
potential meanings of ones data. Amanda Coffey and Paul Atkinson suggest that
qualitative coding entails three basic procedures: “(a) noticing relevant phenomena, (b)
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collecting examples of those phenomena, and (c) analyzing those phenomena in order to
find commonalities, differences, patterns, and structures” (1996, p. 29).
At each step of the way of my analysis I wrote up memos, both procedural ones
and analytical ones. Procedural memos helped me remember how I did my coding, what
kinds of categories I created, and so forth. These memos were important to help keep
track of what I had done. Analytical memos helped me think about the categories and
themes that I developed in my analysis. They helped me focus on what was important in
my data and to make connections between cases. These memos contained my hunches
and ideas and best guesses about what I should be thinking about. As I developed my
coding further, these memos got more and more detailed (Esterberg, 2002). Coding
serves the purpose of data compilation. Following data compilation came the process of
developing an analysis, which included looking for patterns in the data (similarities and
differences), comparing cases, building typologies, and conducting a content analysis
(Esterberg, 2002).
2.3. Positionality and the politics of fieldwork
Fieldwork is undeniably important in Latin American geography, yet despite this
importance there is an absence of a dialogue about the politics of fieldwork within the
sub-discipline (Sundberg, 2003, 2005). Juanita Sundberg draws on feminist and postcolonial theories about the production of knowledge to suggest that this silence about
fieldwork is rooted in masculinist notions of objectivity that predominate Latin American
geography. Sundberg has argued that critical geographies of Latin America must begin
with an analysis of how and why the bodies and geographies of geographers
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themselves matter. She argues for increased attention to the nexus of power and
knowledge and in particular, to how researcher’s geographical location, social status, race
and gender fundamentally shape the questions asked, the data collected, and the
interpretation of the data (Sundberg, 2003). However, to focus on the geographer as a
producer of knowledge is not to advocate the kind of navel gazing so abhorrent to many
scholars. Rather, it is an effort to call attention to and critically assess how the
geographer's embodied social position and geographic location inform the production of
knowledge about and representations of Latin American people and nature (Sundberg,
2005, p.17).
Much like Juanita, I as a white woman conducting research in Guatemala have
been made acutely aware of the ways in which my gender, race, and biography as a
privileged Icelandic citizen and student at a private university in the United States shape
all levels of my research. I have tried to reflect upon this as I try to situate myself as a
critical, feminist geographer working in Latin America. In thinking about and doing
research I try to be self-reflexive about my position (geographic location, social status,
race, and gender) and to consider how power relations are embedded in the very
interpretative nature of research. I see this as a political intervention and contribution to
the broader goals of emancipatory politics shared by human geographers.
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Chapter three: “This is not a game”: Shaping political actions 'from above' in
environmental conflicts in Guatemala
I. Introduction
In an interview titled “This is not a game”,3 the president of the pro-military
NGO, the “Foundation Against Terrorism” (Fundación Contra el Terrorismo -FCT),
Ricardo Méndez-Ruiz, explained why his NGO and the private sector in Guatemala
shared a common interest in reversing the results of the genocide trial against former
dictator Ríos-Montt. According to Méndez-Ruiz, the private sector and the military are
allies in a common fight because the post-war legal proceedings against the military not
only threaten the military, but also the dominant position of the private sector and elites.
This statement illustrates how the civil war, its violence, and the main parties involved
are recurrent themes in contemporary Guatemalan society. In the interview, Méndez-Ruiz
also mentioned land, agrarian issues and the extractive industries as being at risk from
popular revolts.
In this paper we study conflicts relating to extractive industries that have
proliferated throughout rural areas in Guatemala since the early 2000s. In doing so, we
show how the legacies of the civil war (1960-1996) shape the ways in which the private
sector and the government react to contentious politics. The Peace Accords were never
completely implemented and room for including “others” in dialogue, negotiations and in
3

https://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/esto-no-es-un-juego
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decision-making remains limited. As a result, the private sector and the government are
able to engage in practices that aim to undermine and suppress opposition to extractive
industries, while at the same time trying to make extractive operations politically and
socially legitimate for certain social groups. Activists are increasingly portrayed in
similar ways as insurgents during the war, when the figure of the ‘internal enemy’ was
central to normalizing counterinsurgency and genocide. This particular framing of
opposition to extractive industries fosters a hostile climate that enables corporate
counterinsurgency and state repression.
In the early days of the peace talks the notion of “politics as a continuation of
war” was put forward by former ministry of defense General Alejandro Gramajo, who in
an interview told Jennifer Schrimer the following:
Our strategic goal has been to reverse Clausewitz’s philosophy of war to state that in
Guatemala, politics must be the continuation of war. But that does not mean that we
are abandoning war; we are fighting it from a much broader horizon within a
democratic framework. We may be renovating our methods of warfare but we are not
abandoning them… we are continuing our [counterinsurgency] operations [against]
international subversion because the Constitution demands it (Schirmer, 1998, p. 1)
Central to the counterinsurgency campaign during the civil war were several
programs that intended to reshape territories and people’s lives. Counterinsurgency
campaigns took place in tandem with a series of public relations programs, the
construction of infrastructure, the establishment of “model villages” and other programs
designed to “win the hearts and minds of the population” (Interview with General
Gramajo in Schimrer 1998; see also Gould, 2018). The civil war was not only a military
project; it was political and economic, in the sense that it was a project designed to shape
territories and space (Ybarra, 2012). We argue that responses ‘from above’ to
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contemporary opposition against extractive industries can to some extent be understood
as an extension of the “politics as a continuation of war”. As we will outline below,
contemporary extractive conflicts in Guatemala are shaped by the post-war context in
which they take place and are characterized by the continuation of many of the root
causes of the war, such as inequality, a highly skewed distribution of land and exclusion
of the indigenous population from civil and political participation.
Our analysis draws on data gathered through fieldwork between 2013-2017 and
focuses on four mining projects. We conducted interviews with corporate representatives,
associations and groups that protect and promote private sector interests, lawyers, public
servants, and Guatemalan elites. We interviewed actors engaged in resistance against
extractive projects, legal advisors representing them, and allied organizations. Our
research is also based on participant observation with the aforementioned actors and
includes, for example, visits to projects sites and participation in private sector
conferences, as well as participating in anti-extractive demonstrations, meetings and
public court hearings.
1.1. Theoretical considerations
There is a growing body of literature on mobilizations against resource extraction
that is dedicated to better understanding how political reactions ‘from above’ emerge and
take shape (Brock & Dunlap, 2018; Dunlap, 2018b, p. 2018; Geenen & Verweijen,
2017). This literature attempts to understand the actions taken by governments,
corporations and allied elites to legitimize and actualize their operations. Geenen and
Verweijen (2017, p. 758) further argue that to understand social mobilizations against
resource extraction, it is important to study the interplay between political actions and
27

reactions both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, and to recognize the diversity of these
reactions.
With our contribution we wish to respond to calls to further study the interplay
between political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ in environmental struggles. We
argue that political actions from above and from below are dialectically interrelated, with
dynamic and contested interactions between actors within and between scales. By
theorizing and substantiating empirically shifting spatial configurations in mobilization
and counter-mobilizations we aim to contribute to advancing theoretical debates on the
spatialities of politics in environmental struggles.
We hold that spatialities (e.g. place, scale, networks, positionality, and mobility)
are active, dynamic, and composed of social relations (Leitner & Sheppard, 2018;
Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto, 2008; Massey, 2005). Additionally, in theorizing
spatialities, we have to examine the co-implication of particular spatialities in particular
contexts. Leitner et al. (2008), drawing inspiration from Massey’s relational space
(Massey, 2005), argue that it is not simply a question of the co-presence of the relevant
spatialities, but also how they shape one another and, thereby, the trajectories of
contentious politics. Finally, we see spatialities as processual; always in the making,
never finished and never closed (Massey, 1999, pp. 2–3). Understanding spatialities as
relational, multivalent and co-implicated enables us to reconnect the spatial with the
political and confront structurally embedded power relations (Merriman et al., 2012).
This article examines how shifting sociospatial relations come about and how
shifting spatialities shape – and are reshaped by – the dialectics between political actions
from above and from below. The spatialities of politics are often conceptualised through
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the lens of the politics of scale (Leitner et al., 2008; MacKinnon, 2011). Scale is
conceptualised as a relational, power-laden and contested construction that actors
strategically engage with, in order to legitimise or challenge existing power relations. In
the course of these struggles new scales are constructed, and the relative importance of
different scales is reconfigured. This process is highly contested, involving numerous
negotiations and struggles between different actors as they attempt to reshape the scalar
spatiality of power and authority (Leitner, 1997; Leitner et al., 2008).
Our study aims to contribute to these theoretical debates by examining the
dialectic of political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ in environmental struggles in
Guatemala. We do so by analysing the complex configurations of corporate-governmentelite-military networks, and how these networks operate. We also look at the interplay
between corporate/state mobilization on the one hand, and grassroots mobilization on the
other, analysing how they mutually shape each other. We argue that these reactions must
be interpreted against the backdrop of competition and alliances between different elite
groups that pursue projects of power and authority, which require control over politicaland security forces. Furthermore, these reactions must be understood in the context of a
post-war state that has failed to establish hegemony in the Gramscian sense.
In post-war Guatemala, political and business interests are entangled in ways that
engender conflict and violence, for example, through linkages between private security
actors and the economic elite, and between ex-military and private security actors, or
some combination thereof. These shifting sociospatial relations build on the legacies of
the civil war, the context in which the peace process developed and the failure to enact
structural transformations after the signing of the Peace Accords. Social movements and
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local actors also gained new knowledge, accessed transnational networks and
strengthened their organization as a result of the peace negotiations and the Peace
Accords (Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 2017).
Thus, we argue that extractive conflicts are part of emergent forms of scalar
politics where different actors struggle to (re)consolidate power and authority in the
hands of competing groups. These processes intersect with the strategies of grassroots
movements engaged in multi-scalar strategies by drawing on transnational alliances in a
struggle where conflicting global discourses are developed and deployed in contested
ways. Spatialities shape the conditions of possibility for political action. They matter for
the imaginaries, material practices and emergent trajectories of environmental struggles.
By examining the shifting spatialities of political actions we are able to reveal the
articulations of emergent power relations and make visible some of the power geometries
in environmental struggles.
2. Conceptualising counterinsurgency in contemporary Guatemala
The counterinsurgency campaigns in Guatemala were carefully crafted, detailed
in handbooks and taught in special courses, for example at the School of the Americas.
Such campaigns materialised in the form of massacres, terror, sexual violence, selective
assassinations, and kidnappings; as well as in the form of campaigns to gain the “hearts
and minds” of the population. These campaigns, engineered within the Kennedy
Administration’s counterinsurgency programme (officially known as military civic
action, MCA), included food programs, relocations, building of infrastructure, medical
assistance, literacy programs etc. (Flores, 2017; Gould, 2018; McAllister & Nelson,
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2013; Schirmer, 1998). To some military experts, the MCA was as important as
intelligence and operations in the counterinsurgency effort (Gould, 2018).
Guatemala’s state crafting project was – and in many ways remains - a strategy
that combines democracy with counterinsurgency. In the words of General Gramajo,
quoted by Jennifer Schirmer (1998, p. 1); “in Guatemala, a democracy was born out of
the womb of a counterinsurgency campaign”. Flores (2017) argues that despite the
official disappearance of the counterinsurgency state, counterinsurgency has become
common sense among large factions of Guatemalans for whom the lack of empathy
towards the victims of state violence has been normalized. On the other hand, the
incapacity and lack of interest on behalf of elite factions to arrive at broad agreements on
a nation and state building project has shaped a particular form of state in Guatemala
(Illmer, 2018). This is characterized both by a lack of state hegemony in the Gramscian
sense, and by the absence of a legitimate monopoly of violence in the Weberian sense,
which becomes further compounded by disaccord about what counts as legitimate
violence. As Gramsci argued, the lack of hegemony by dominating groups in the
formation of discourses, subjectivities and political blocs, leads to a domination of
subalterns that is dictatorial and crude (Gramsci & Nowell-Smith, 1972).
In Guatemala, violence has remained a resource in most political struggles, also
between elites in their competition for domination and economic gains (Bull, 2014). One
expression of the failure to establish a monopoly of legitimate violence is the
instrumental but shifting relationship between the economic elite and the military. During
the civil war, the economic elite collaborated with the military, particularly during the
government of Ríos Montt. The economic elite provided funds and political support to
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the former dictator, members of the elite occupied positions in his government, and the
elite embarked on an international lobby campaign to improve the image of the dictator
and of Guatemala (Rodríguez-Pellecer, 2013). However, the fact that the military
controlled much of the state, held high positions in various state enterprises, and acquired
economic benefits from such positions, increased tension among dominating sectors
within the economic elite, who in the 1990s were advocating a minimalist state (Bull,
2005).
There was also discord within the military between those known as “the
institutionalists”, who supported the peace process, and the “Officers of the Mountain”
who suggested that they had won the war on the battlefield4. This latter view was shared
with the ultraconservative landowner elite (Schirmer, 1998, pp. 210–211). The
institutionalists advocated “politics as a continuation of war,” where war was continued
under civilian rule in such a way that the army was not held accountable for war crimes
(Schirmer, 1998). Schirmer (p. 234) also points out that what the extreme right-wing
factions within the military and among the ultraconservative landowner elite failed to
understand was that this ‘strategic combination’ is, over the long run, far more efficient
and sophisticated in its maintenance of control than cycles of full-scale violence.
However, as McAllister and Nelson (2013) argue, power is polyvalent; alliances can be
disrupted and turned to other agendas, and the political entails the possibility of reversals
and changes. Even “politics as a continuation of war” do not imply a simple or smooth
execution of strategy. It is within the idea that power is polyvalent that one can make

4

For an comprehensive discussion on the Officers of the Mountain see Schirmer (1998), chapter
9.
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sense and understand the dialectical and dynamic relationship between strategies from
“above” and from “below” and the outcomes of this relationship.
Jenny Pearce (2018, pp. 5–6) puts forth the notion of a “fragmented security
state” to explain the kind of state emerging in Latin America in the context of
globalisation, which is favoured by the elites, seeking to promote and protect their own
interests. The outcome of this state is the reproduction of violence in society and
particularly amongst the poorest segments of the population. The permeability of this
state is what matters to elites. Influence trafficking is imperative to securing this
permeability but comes at the cost of independent and autonomous legal systems. For
example, as the case of Guatemala exemplifies, such states have judicial systems that
privilege the protection of private property rights and business transactions over criminal
law and civil rights. In such a state project, violence remains not only part of the state’s
policy repertoire but is also unbound by legality. Violence, then, is de facto, an everyday
tool of political, social and economic interactions. It is used selectively with impunity by
state security forces, some of which ally or make deals with traditional and emerging
elites. The entanglements of bureaucratic and political actors with these elites secure the
legitimization of this de facto governance model.
Through a series of economic reforms, including trade liberalization, privatization
of state enterprises and decentralization, a particular form of state formally aiming to
strengthen the general conditions for business - although often privileging a few consolidated the privileged position of private business in the economy towards the end
of the war. The ink in the Peace Accords had not yet dried when the government started
to negotiate the framework for the implementation of a new set of policies that enabled a
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new wave of investments in the primary sector. The domestic private sector
enthusiastically embraced these negotiations and there were several local initiatives
promoting the discourse of economic liberalization and a minimal state (Bull, 2005).
Furthermore, the new policies highlighted the participation of the private sector,
including in natural resource-based sectors such as agro-industry, hydropower, oil and
minerals. The model was also based on close collaboration with private business, both
domestic and transnational, in the formulation of laws, the selection of priorities in
regards to public policy, and regulatory frameworks (Dougherty, 2011).
The mechanisms used to secure the expansion of the extractive industries were
already in place before the end of the war (Aguilar-Støen, 2016; Solano, 2013).
Contemporary extractive conflicts highlight that the inroads for new investments at the
end of the war were accompanied by a complex- albeit more subtle- form of violence,
which emerged in a historical context that makes it in our analysis impossible to simply
ignore the war.
3. The post-war context
This section discusses the most salient features of the Guatemalan post-war
context, which are defined by the strengthening of civil society, changing elite dynamics
and elite competition, as well as shifting opportunity structures following the
demobilisation of the military.
3.1. The strengthening of civil society
The peace process resulted in the opening of certain political spaces to subaltern
actors and the development of legal instruments that sought to strengthen popular
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participation in decision-making related to development. As a result, resistance
movements have turned to these legal frameworks to claim their right to participation.
Prominent actors, including International Financial Institutions and the modernizing
sector of the elite promoted neoliberal reforms jointly with the promotion of liberal
political institutions, and emphasized the importance of participation by civil society
(Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019; Rettberg, 2007). Within this context several grassroots
organizations, including indigenous ones, successfully allied with national and
transnational NGOs to gain recognition of their collective rights. One of the results of
their joint work was the ratification of the International Labour Organization’s
Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 169) by the government of
Guatemala in 1996. This convention has also been used as a framework for legitimate
consultation claims regarding extractive projects.
Political changes that formally opened spaces for civil society groups were not the
only factors that increased civil society participation and influence. People living in exile
or in refugee camps during the war gained considerable organizational experience prior to
the signing of the Peace Accords. Women and indigenous peoples overcame
marginalized roles and gained experience in negotiation and project development. After
the signing of the Peace Accords, these actors found new, albeit limited, political spaces
in which they could make their voices heard (Brett, 2016). This would eventually set the
stage on which indigenous and other rural peoples could claim better participation in
decision-making regarding mining, oil and hydropower.
The Peace Accords opened a path through which some historically rooted
socioeconomic injustices could be addressed. However, the required constitutional
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reforms never materialized. A national referendum in 1999 rejected the Constitutional
changes required to implement political and economic reforms needed to change or
eliminate the structural origins of social conflict in Guatemala, such as inequality, land
concentration, lack of institutions for the redistribution of income, and racism (McAllister
& Nelson, 2013). The signing of the Peace Accords resulted in a transformation of the
ways in which direct violence manifests itself in the country. However, the inherent
structural violence embedded in the organization of Guatemalan society remains
unchanged (Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 2017). Changes related to the role of the army in postwar Guatemala, although implemented to some extent, did not dismantle the power of the
army within the government. As we will discuss below, this failure is partly a result of
the increasing competition between elites in Guatemala. Popular claims and demands
related to extractive industries show that, despite the signing of the Peace Accords, the
aspirations and demands of subaltern groups have not been included in the post-war
social, political and economic reorganization of the state.
A series of new national and international legal instruments that sought to
strengthen popular participation in decision-making processes also came into being and
required new forms of responses from above. The UN-International Labour
Organization’s (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 169,
1989), as well as on the country’s Municipal Code, Decree 12-2002, and the Law of
Local Development Councils all secure rights to participation in decision making and
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of indigenous peoples, and in certain cases, of
local non-indigenous communities. Groups opposing extractive projects increasingly
mobilize rights-based discourses, legal mechanisms and strategic litigation. In recent
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years, strategic litigation has disrupted extractive projects and Guatemalan courts have
suspended and cancelled the operating licences of several projects due to the failure to
properly consult with affected indigenous populations. From our interviews with lawyers
it became evident that just in the last six years more than 25 cases have been brought on
behalf of indigenous groups against the State of Guatemala for granting mining and
hydropower licenses without complying with the right to (FPIC).
3.2. Shifting elite dynamics in the post-war era
The combination of political changes related to post-war democratization and
economic changes starting in the 1980s led to the emergence of new elites and new
factions within the traditional elite. The economic elite adapted to global economic
changes by forming alliances with transnational corporations and by expanding
regionally and globally (Bull, Castellacci, & Kasahara, 2014). Additionally, new groups
controlling important resources in the country started to challenge the economic
dominance of the old landed elite, including in the media sector and telecommunications
(Bull, 2005; Solano, 2015a). In the extractive industries, there are also new international
actors, for instance, Canadian, Russian and U.S. mining firms, European firms in
hydropower development and Nicaraguan groups in sugarcane production. Finally,
former military officers who enriched themselves through illegal activities during the war
now fight for the control of political parties, and largely control private security firms
(Argueta, 2012).
There are also various ways in which domestic elites collaborate in new ways
with transnational companies. This includes domestic economic groups participating as
minor partners in specific projects. Domestic companies function as service providers for
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transnational companies, for instance, electricity, infrastructure and equipment. They also
function as political “door openers” for transnational companies. Even though mining is
of minor economic importance to Guatemala’s economy, to control activities associated
to mining may be of great importance for the domestic elite, not only in economic terms
but to maintain their influence within competing power networks (Aguilar-Støen & Bull,
2016).
The fall of former president Pérez Molina and former vice-president Baldetti in 2015
due to the discovery of a corruption ring in the toll office, known as “La línea,” shows
that control of the state apparatus is no longer exclusive to the economic elite. The
military, particularly war officers, had disputed control over the toll office since before
the signing of the Peace Accords (Estrada & Rodriguez, 2015; Peacock & Beltrán, 2003).
Changing elite dynamics also led to new ways to control the state through campaign
financing, as revealed by the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
(CICIG, for its acronym in Spanish). While in the past the economic elite was the main
financer of electoral campaigns, currently the economic elite contributes 25% of the
funding, 50% comes from companies providing services to the state, and the remaining
25% comes from illicit structures, mainly drug trafficking (CICIG, 2015).
Both the legislative and executive branches are increasingly sites of competition
between old and new elites. As shown by Briscoe and Rodríguez-Pellecer (2010) the
Legislative Assembly can be compared to a market place where political favours are
bought and sold, open to the influences of groups associated with licit as well as illicit
sectors. Despite this, the traditional elite continues to hold strong influence in the
legislative and executive branches of the state. Naveda (2011) suggests that the most
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powerful Guatemalan elite (family) corporations contributed to funding the political
campaigns of former presidents Arzú, Berger and Pérez Molina. Once their candidate is
in office, members of these groups take positions in the government (Valdez, 2003).
Ideological affinity is not a requisite for the elite to offer economic support to the
candidates. Rather, they pursue a strategy of supporting whoever has better odds of
winning so as to secure their economic interests and to establish new business
opportunities that further strengthen their position. This happens, for example, through
their influence on the drafting of favourable laws (notably for our case, the mining bill
and the electric energy bill) (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017;
Dougherty, 2011).
3.3. The demobilization of the military, shifting opportunity structures and
emerging private security assemblages
In addition to competition between old and new elites, the demobilization of the
military also led to various power struggles and shifting opportunity structures resulting
in novel, emerging private security assemblages. Military personnel entered into illegal
activities during the civil war (smuggling, tax evasion, drug trafficking) through diffuse
and shifting networks by way of which they amassed considerable fortunes (Gagne,
2016; Peacock & Beltrán, 2003). As a result of the volatility of such networks and the
illegal nature of their activities, it was crucial to secure access to and control of the
intelligence offices of the government. A key resource was the Estado Mayor
Presidencial (EMP). Several corruption cases revealed that struggles to control the EMP
were also related to the fight for political power and authority. The goal of controlling
intelligence offices seems to be related to the opportunities it provided for monitoring and
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maintaining surveillance of the activities of competing illegal networks5. The dissolution
of the EMP in 2003 did not mean that the military completely lost access to intelligence
offices. Indeed, some of them entered newly created civilian intelligence offices while
others joined the private sector, and organised crime, drug trafficking and other legal and
illegal activities (Argueta, 2012).
The private security sector absorbed a considerable number of former military
personnel in a process that intensified after 1996 (Argueta, 2012). Additionally,
international security advisors, particularly from the USA and Israel, who advised the
military on issues related to military intelligence during the civil war, started to provide
security services to the private sector in Guatemala. This proved profitable and they
eventually established their own private security firms in alliance with Israeli and British
companies (Argueta, 2012; Solano, 2015b, 2015c). Some of these transnational security
companies, Golan, Yantarni, Centurion Security and several domestic companies like
Grupo Escorpión S.A., provide security and intelligence services to mining and oil
companies. The manager of Grupo Escorpión S.A.- a company involved in a corruption
case as revealed by CICIG in 2015 - is a former military serviceman with links to Grupo
Golan (Solano, 2015a).
Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) have theorized the processes described here as
“global security assemblages.” By situating security privatization within broader

5

Various former military members who worked at the EMP are accused in the aforementioned
corruption cases, are also accused or convicted in cases related to crimes committed during the
civil war; or both. For example: Manuel Antonio Callejas y Callejas (Caso Moreno, Caso Molina
Thyssen, drug trafficking); former general Luis Francisco Ortega Menaldo (Caso Moreno); Otto
Pérez-Molina (Caso la línea, caso cooptación del estado); Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera (Caso
Moreno; Caso Mirna Mack).
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transformations in the relationship between public and private power and authority,
Abrahamsen and Williams analyse the emergence of global security assemblages;
settings where a range of different global and local, public and private security agents
interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms of
security governance (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p. 3). These changes indicate
important developments in the relationship between security and the state, structures of
political power and authority, and the operations of global capital. In the next section we
turn our attention to how these development shape and are shaped by tactics and
strategies of resistance from grassroots organizations.
4. Resistance ‘from below’ and changing spatialities of contentious politics
Emerging political reactions to extractive projects address a range of interrelated
concerns, including discontent over unfair distribution of environmental risk stemming
from projects and threats to land-based livelihoods. Contention also stems from the
perceived asymmetry between profits earned by corporations and low gains for the
government and host-communities, deriving from non-inclusive legislative processes
characterized by strong favouritism towards industry, as our interviews reveal.
Opposition is also related to failure of governments to comply with and respect the rights
of indigenous peoples and their political autonomy. More broadly, movements question
ideas and visions of development that they feel dispossess and exclude them and express
discontent over the unequal distribution of socio-environmental benefits and burdens
from extractive projects (Cf. Hall et al., 2015).
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For the purpose of this paper, we focus on political reactions ‘from below’ as they
relate to opposition to the mining industry (Hall et al., 2015). There are four major
mining conflicts across Guatemala that are important to our analysis: The Marlin mine in
San Marcos, the Fenix mine in Izabal, the El Tambor mine in Guatemala, and the Escobal
mine in Santa Rosa6. Table 1. summarises the main features of the conflicts we included
in our analysis. The oldest project (Fenix) dates back to the beginning of the civil war
while the extraction licence of the most recent one (El Escobal) was approved in 2013. A
Russian company owns one mining project (Fenix) while North American companies
(Canada and USA) own the rest. The Marlin mine operated from 2005 to 2017 and was
Guatemala’s first large-scale gold mine. The mine is now closed and is currently
undergoing a reclamation process. Recently the Guatemalan Supreme and the
Constitutional Court suspended mining activities in the cases of the Tambor and the
Escobal projects for failing to consult affected communities prior to the installation of the
projects.
We observe several common tactics and strategies used by social movements
resisting mining projects. These include organizing community referendums, staging
demonstrations and the use of roadblocks. Social movements participate in transnational
activist networks and collaborate with international NGOs and religious groups (Della
Porta & Tarrow, 2005). From our interviews and analysis of resistance campaigns it
became clear that activists increasingly engage in legal action framed as an attempt to

6

There are also other ongoing conflicts that share similarities with the ones we analyze here but
that were not included in our study, for example, the Cerro Blanco gold mining project owned by
Bluestone Resources and the San Gabriel cement project owned by Guatemalan Cementos
Progreso.
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legitimize their right to participate in environmental decision-making. Legal action is also
a strategy used to halt, slow down or cancel projects. Legal action, if well-advertised and
in the cases where shareholders care, can also harm corporate and government reputation,
hurting profitability, and as such is a formidable method for exerting pressure on
corporations and governments.
These practices form part of a larger process of using multi-scalar strategies by
shifting scales of collective action and politics of networking7. There are three important
processes within the changing scales of anti-mining resistance in Guatemala: diffusion of
collective action, externalization of claims, and transnational coalition forming. Diffusion
is the spread of ideas, practices, and frames from one site to another. Externalization is
the vertical projection or ‘stretching’ of place-based claims onto institutions or actors in
different places. Transnational coalition forming is the formation of dynamic trans-local
networks among actors from different sites with similar claims (Della Porta & Tarrow,
2005; Tarrow, 2005). Through processes of shifting scales of collective reaction, actors,
organizations, and social movements that oppose extractive projects try to both ‘undo’
and ‘fix’ certain ‘scales’ that are the material expressions of power relations, and they do
so in order to rescale and dislodge corporate-government-military geometries of power
(González, 2006; MacKinnon, 2011).
Community mining consultations are an example of place-based action
shifting/stretching scales to produce coordinated transnational action. Walter and Urkidi
(2017, p. 265) argue that community consultations are being institutionalized in the
7

Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly have written in detail about scale shift in
transnational contention, which simply put, is the spread of collective action beyond its typically
localized origins (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow & McAdam, 2005).
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context of mining conflicts in Latin America. Consultations are not isolated experiences
but constitute a strategy diffused and transformed in the midst of multi-scalar learning
processes where social movements exchange strategies, experiences and discourses. This
is certainly the case in Guatemala, where the diffusion of practices takes place both intranationally and internationally. The first community referendum on mining in Guatemala
took place in 2005 when the people of Sipakapa voted overwhelmingly against the
Marlin mine in San Marcos. The referendum became a milestone in the history of
contemporary anti-mining movements in Guatemala (Urkidi, 2011; Yagenova & Garcia,
2009). In the years following the Sipakapa referendum there has been a wave of
consultations in Guatemala and the community referendum has become one of the most
important resources used by social movements in their struggle against extractive
projects.
Guatemalan activists also increasingly engage in legal action in attempts to
legitimize their claims and to stop projects. Legal action offers strategic resources to
social movements who often otherwise lack the ability to alter corporate practices. The
threat of litigation may be one of the few sources of regulatory power available in the
neoliberal world order that can radically transform the playing field in which corporations
and their critics interact (Kirsch, 2014). Through judicial processes, Guatemalan social
movements stake their claims internationally, producing new scales of resistance and
environmental struggles. Domestic courts in industrialized countries are increasingly
willing to hear cases filed against companies that operate in foreign countries. In 2014,
the Norwegian Pension Fund divested from a Canadian mining company, Tahoe
Resources, for grave violations of the human rights of Guatemalan indigenous and
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environmental activists8. One of those cases was brought to Canadian courts. Two
Canadian mining companies are currently being held accountable on their home turf for
violations they are accused of have committed in Guatemala. In 2017, a shareholder class
action was filed in the United States against a Canadian mining company operating in
Guatemala for failure to properly inform shareholders about local opposition against the
mining project (Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, 2017; Quan, 2017).
Anti-extractive resistance in Guatemala has taken on the shape of a web of
networked groups that bridge claims and identities (i.e. indigenous and peasant),
highlighting the many ways in which environmental concerns intersect with demands for
social and economic justice (Martínez-Alier, 2002). Indigenous authorities, the rural
poor, the Catholic Church, as well as national and international networks of activists
share knowledge and experiences, which shape the dynamics of anti-extractive resistance
in Guatemala and as such political actions ‘from below’. This proliferation of new forms
of multi-scalar resistance stretches across boundaries of scale, reproduces new scales, and
restructures existing scales of resistance and environmental struggles. By deploying
scalar strategies, social movements make their voices heard to expand and secure their
political and geographical power (Jones, Leitner, Marston, & Sheppard, 2017).
5. The dialectics between responses ‘from above’ and ‘from below’
Here we analyse the imaginaries and discursive practices mobilized by corporategovernment networks in response to social mobilization ‘from below,’ and the ways in
which responses from ‘above’ and ‘below’ mutually shape each other. Scale frames are

8

https://etikkradet.no/files/2017/02/Tilrådning_Tahoe-Resources_8-4-2014.pdf
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developed and deployed to locate problems and causes at particular scales in order to
delegitimize opposition, particularly with reference to national security and discourses on
terrorism under the influence of the “war on terror” or the “war on drugs” (Kurtz, 2003;
Martin & Miller, 2003).
5.1. The changing dynamics of violence and repression
In Guatemala, corporate and state actors have historically mobilized violence and
repression in attempts to manage dissent and maintain control. During the civil war
reactions to mining opposition were decisively violent. At the height of the war in the
1970s and early 1980s numerous human rights abuses were committed by the military at
Fenix nickel mine9 in the El Estor region10 (Nolin & Stephens, 2010; Solano, 2015b).
Violence and repression, including assassinations, assaults, forced evictions, rape, and
criminalization of dissent remain a common response to contemporary mining
opposition. However, whereas during the civil war the main perpetrators were public
security forces, currently, public security forces operate in tandem with private security
firms. The various types of links and networks that international mining companies

9

The Fenix nickel mine in El Estor was the first transnational metal mining project in Guatemala.
For a detailed discussion of the history of the Fenix Project and INCO see Fox (2015).

10

To this day, the Fenix project continues to be plagued with accounts of human rights violations
and violent evictions. Hudbay Minerals Inc., which owned and operated the mine from 2004 until
2011, remains caught up in a lawsuit regarding the killing of Adolfo Ich (killed by private
security forces employed at the Fenix project), a lawsuit regarding the shooting of German Chub
Choc (German was shot at close range in an unprovoked attack by the head of security personnel
for Hudbay’s Fenix project), and a lawsuit regarding the rapes of 11 Mayan Q’eqchi’ women (the
women were raped by uniformed mining company security personnel, police and military during
the forceful expulsion of Mayan Q’eqchi’ families from their farms and homes in the remote
community of Lote Ocho) (Klippensteins, Barristers & Solicitors, 2018).
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establish with Guatemala’s domestic elite also include contact with private security firms,
which often have ties to international security firms.
Local grassroots movements, for their part, have responded to violence in a
variety of ways. In the Escobal case, because many of the indigenous people from
Eastern Guatemala of a certain age have a military background, and many of the younger
ones also attended the military academy11, their resistance mobilizations included
counterinsurgency intelligence tactics to organize and protect themselves. These tactics
shape how they organize their blockades, communicate and coordinate their movements.
In Guatemala, violence remains a resource in most political struggles and
certainly in ‘engineering extraction.’ However, there have been shifts and rescaling in the
spatialities of violence, from the public security forces holding a legitimate monopoly of
violence (albeit a weak one) to new private security assemblages. These assemblages
emerged, as we have discussed above, in the aftermath of the civil war and in the context
of the changing dynamics of intra-elite conflicts and competition.
5.2. The enduring “internal enemy”
One of the most salient resources employed by the Guatemalan elite when its
interests are threatened is to conjure up the image of the internal enemy by demonizing
its opponents as ‘communists’ or ‘terrorists’. This is by no means a new strategy. In
order to protect its interests, the extreme right-wing landowner elite and the private sector
have traditionally cultivated and depended upon visceral reactions to the guerrilla and to

11

For the indigenous population of Eastern Guatemala since the beginning of the 20th century the
army has been a common vehicle for social mobility. A special army task force during the civil
war was called “Jalapa Battalion” and it was composed mostly of Xinka indigenous from
Jalapa/Xalapán.
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‘communism’ among the military and certain segments of Guatemalan society (Schirmer,
1998). In the contemporary context, and as a response to the growing mobilization
against extractive industries, the government and the economic elite have revived the
notion of the internal enemy. This strategy unifies otherwise divided elites and justifies
the use of violence against dissidents who threaten ‘national stability’ and economic
growth, further entrenching elite power, which now also includes military elites.
Ibarra (2006, p. 195) argues that the decade between 1944 and 1954 created a
space for collective subjects’ political participation in a way that was unacceptable for the
business sector, the ecclesiastic hierarchy and the extreme right wing. The figure of the
internal enemy was conceived and could be applied to members of the communist party,
opposition politicians, catholic priests, union leaders, students, intellectuals, and rural
activists (Oglesby & Ross, 2009). Its purpose was to legitimize violence and eventually
genocide against the indigenous population during the civil war (Ibarra, 2006).
Nowadays, the figure of the internal enemy assumes primarily three forms: 1)
communists, 2) terrorists, and 3) intersections with racist discourses.
Our analysis of the media indicates that anti-communist and anti-terrorist rhetoric
are also intertwined with racist discourses against the indigenous peoples of Guatemala.
The media is often used to appeal to the widespread racism in mestizo and white
Guatemalans, blaming the indigenous movement for wanting to impose ways of
governing that would divide society in indigenous (with more privileges) and nonindigenous (with fewer rights).
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In the early 2000s groups like Liga Pro-Patria,12 the Foundation against Terrorism,
and the military veterans’ association (AVEMILGUA) started to portray those fighting
for transitional justice as communists and enemies of the state (Molden, 2016). Then as
the first protests against mining emerged in the early 2000s13, a similar rhetoric was used
against protestors.
It was after the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York that the rhetoric of the military
veterans and their sympathisers increasingly started to use the term “terrorist”
interchangeably with “communist”. ‘Terrorist’ was of course a term also used during the
cold war, but its popularity as the new stereotype of the “other” that threatens national
security increased only recently in Guatemala. In 2005, the penal code was amended to
include the legal figure of “terrorist,” which allowed FCT, Liga Pro-Patria and the Public
Prosecutor’s Office to charge human rights activists who oppose extractive projects with
terrorism. The Public Prosecutor’s office (Ministerio Público) charged activists who
protested against mining in Santa Rosa on terrorism charges in 2013. Following the 2014
massacre in the town of ”Los Pajoques,” the company described the activism of those
who oppose the San Gabriel mining project as acts of terrorism.
5.3. Corporate-government counterinsurgency
The corporate-government nexus also engages in ‘corporate counterinsurgency’
tactics in response to extractive opposition (Cf. Brock and Dunlap, 2018). Opposition
12

Liga Pro-Patria was formed by Francisco Bianchi, pastor of the evangelical church Verbo, the
same church to which Ríos Montt belonged (Handy, 2003).

13

The conflict associated with the Marlin mine that broke out in 2004 marks perhaps the
beginning of the contemporary Guatemalan anti-mining movement.
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against the extractive industries has been elevated to an issue of national security. The
counterinsurgency discourse became embedded in formal policy when, in March 2013,
the National Security Council of Guatemala (NSC)14 decided that social conflicts related
to extractive projects should be approached from the perspective of national security. The
NSC then created the Inter-institutional Commission for Integral Development” (ICID)15,
which is led by a retired colonel from the Ministry of Interior, and whose role is to collect
intelligence, produce socio-political maps, identify issues related to royalties and conduct
analysis of communities and social movements (Hernández, 2014; Solano, 2015c). In the
framing of conflicts as issues of national security there are remnants of the counterinsurgency strategy of the past when national security was a frequent trope used by the
counter-insurgency state.
This trope contributes now, like then, to manufacturing consent within a segment
of the Guatemalan population for the use of repression and violence against protestors.
This is connected to the government’s frequent evocation of the supposedly on-going
fight against drug trafficking. The link to anti-drugs policy became evident in our
analysis of public discourses by the government as in each of the cases where states of

14

The national security council is an inter-ministerial council that coordinates the National
Security System and is in charge of policy making related to security and advising the president
on security matters. The council is composed of the president and vice-president, the minister of
Foreign Affairs, the minister of Interior, the minister of Defense, the secretary of Strategic
Intelligence of the State and the Attorney General of the Nation
http://www.mindef.mil.gt/leyes_reglamentos/leyes_y_reglamentos/ley_marco_d018-2008.pdf

15

The ICID includes representatives from the Ministry of Energy and Mines; Ministry of the
Environment and Natural Resources; the Ministry of the Interior; the National Council of
Protected Areas; the National Security Council; Secretary for Strategic State Intelligence; the
Attorney General’s office; the Permanent Dialogue Commission; departmental governors and
municipal mayors.
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siege were declared since 2012, the government justified it as a means to combat drug
trafficking (Cf. Paley, 2014). Also, our fieldwork revealed that drug trafficking charges
have been brought against leaders of the anti-mining resistance movements in an attempt
to undermine their activism. These narratives of civil resistance as leftist plot, and/or as
threats to national security, serve to delegitimize resistance to extractive projects and to
justify its repression.
5.4. Lawfare and soft strategies for engineering extraction
In reaction to the different strategies of anti-extractive resistance, such as strategic
grassroots driven litigation and the wave of community referendums on extractive
projects, a number of ‘soft’ strategies from above have emerged. These ‘soft’ techniques
aim to render conflict manageable rather than to outright eradicate oppositional groups
(Dunlap, 2018a). For example, mining companies establish their own community
relations’ offices and sustainable community development programs. These mechanisms
involve quasi-development programs that may involve health services, technical
capacitation, agricultural extension, infrastructure construction and even political training
of community leaders. We also observe an increasing culture of legalism where
corporations and grassroots movements conduct their struggles through “lawfare” – “the
resort to legal instruments…to commit acts of political coercion” (Comaroff & Comaroff,
2006, p. 30).
In response to this increasing culture of legality, the private sector and the
government have taken several seemingly contradictory measures. One prominent
strategy has been to try to undermine claims for participation and delegitimize
mechanisms like the community referendums. In such instances, the private sector has
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raised strong concerns about the ‘lack of legal certainty’, arguing that the ILO 169 is not
being applied correctly and that it weakens national sovereignty. In July 2017, the
umbrella organization of the private sector – CACIF - petitioned the ILO to intervene in
Guatemala, claiming that the Convention was being violated and manipulated. CACIF
claims that recent unfavourable court rulings undermine legal certainty in the country and
infringe on the right to freedom of enterprise and work, generating social conflict
(Bolaños & Gramajo, 2017).
Another reaction to the community referendums has been to deny the existence of
indigenous peoples in areas affected by extractive projects in an attempt to negate the
need for prior consultation as prescribed by the ILO Convention. In the case of the
Escobal mine, following the 2017 court rulings which temporarily suspended the mine’s
licenses because prior consultation requirements had not been met, the private sector
along with several government institutions made statements denying the existence of the
Xinka people, either outright or in the vicinity of the mine. The then president of CACIF
was quoted saying that the Supreme Court’s resolution was based on a “non-existent
community” [referring to the Xinka people] and that as such the court’s resolution was
false (Prensa Libre, 2017). The minister of Energy and Mines supported the private
sector’s perspective, saying that prior to the authorization of the license in 2013 the state
had determined that there are no Xinka in San Rafael Las Flores (Prensa Libre, 2017).
Leifsen et al. (2017) suggest that local groups and their allies´ involvement in processes
like claiming FPIC can have unexpected outcomes. After the rulings of the court, we
have observed in one of our study sites the revitalization of a more politicized Xinka
indigenous identity in the area around the mining project. When a new national census
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was scheduled for 2017, the Xinka parliament launched an information campaign aimed
at increasing the visibility of people who self-identify as Xinka. If successful, a higher
number of indigenous Xinka will be registered in national statistics and the obligation to
consult indigenous people would be strengthened.
Our findings suggest that strategic litigation and the mobilization of discourses of
FPIC engages both grassroots organizations and private companies. Both types of actors
rescale their actions and seek support and chances to exert influence on local processes
by appealing to international treaties (ILO) and lobbying in international arenas. Our
empirical findings seem to contradict Dunlap’s (2018a) conceptualization of FPIC as
“soft” counterinsurgency to manage conflict insofar as in Guatemala the processes and
the claims were launched and sustained by grassroots organizations, and it is only
recently that the government and the private sector are trying to co-opt and control FPIC.
However, we acknowledge that the law is a double-edged sword where it may strengthen
the claims of anti-extractive movements while also enabling new forms of dispossession.
But these processes are still playing out in Guatemala and the last word has yet to be said.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we examined the interplay between political actions ‘from above’
and ‘from below’ in extractive conflicts in Guatemala. We analysed how changing
sociospatial relations come about and how shifting spatialities shape – and are reshaped
by – political actions from above and form below. We argue that political actions from
above and from below are dialectically interrelated, shaped by dynamic and contested
interactions between actors within and between scales. Finally, we argue that extractive
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conflicts are part of emergent forms of scalar politics where different actors struggle to
(re)consolidate power and authority in the hands of competing groups. These shifting
spatial configurations intersect with the strategies of grassroots movements, which
engage in their own scalar strategies, and which are embedded within networked scalar
configurations that extend from local to global relations (Swyngedouw & Heynen, 2003).
The inception of extractive projects in Guatemala has been accompanied by
extraordinary violence. This suggests that in the post-war context the state continues to
fail in implementing a consensus-based strategy of governance, and where different
actors continue to struggle to consolidate power and authority in the hands of competing
groups. Our study demonstrates that emerging political and economic context are shaped
by changing elite dynamics, which in turn continue to sharpen intra- and inter- elite
competition, fostering new ways of strategic alliances without allowing for the
consolidation of a single dominant group. As these groups compete and collaborate in
shifting constellations, they are less interested in neutralizing resistance and dissent via
concessions and forms of compromise, but instead opt for the explicit exclusion and
marginalization of oppositional forces by various mechanisms ranging from discursive
and legal structures to outright violence and repression (Cf. Tansel, 2017). Violence is
discursively justified by linking opposition to extractive industries to the rhetoric of the
civil war, by way of which the notion of the internal enemy is used again. This notion
appeals to the non-indigenous population in such a way that the use of force and violence
becomes grounded in popular consent. The excessive use of violence and the lack of
consensus of what constitutes legitimate violence are also expressions of the failure to
establish state hegemony by dominating groups (Gramsci & Nowell-Smith, 1972)
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In this paper we discussed a range of discursive and material practices mobilized by
corporate-government networks in response to social mobilization ‘from below.’ These
networks frame problems and causes at particular scales in order to delegitimize
opposition, particularly with reference to national security and discourses on terrorism
under the influence of the international “war on terror” or “war on drugs.” These
processes intersect with the strategies of grassroots movements engaging in their own
multi-scalar strategies by drawing on transnational alliances in a struggle where
conflicting global discourses are developed and deployed in contested ways.
The effects of the imageries and practices that are the emergent constellations of
political actions ‘from above,’ are to a great degree formed by class interest of dominant
classes and vary based on socio-political markers. In the case of Guatemala, this
disproportionally affect indigenous groups and individuals, highlighting the continued
relevance of race in the structuring of the Guatemalan society. However, despite the
resources at their disposal, and the asymmetrical power relations that define the
Guatemalan context, elites and their networks do not always succeed in their goals, or at
least not so easily. It is not only subalterns who respond to elite strategies, grassroots
movements also create and change conditions, although these changes might be shortlived, to which the elites respond by creating new scenarios. Indeed, we argue that
political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ are dialectically interrelated and shaped
by dynamic and contested interactions between actors within and between scales. This
dialectical understanding of the relationship between elites and social movements open
the possibility to demystify the elites and to conceptualize them as social actors that are
in constant negotiations and often in conflict with each other.
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The frequent use of violence that we illustrate in our study also attests to the
obstacles to a coherent state building project in post-war contexts in which dominant
social groups do not see the need to build strong institutions or even to agree on what
legitimate violence is. Opposition to extractive industries in Guatemala has been met with
violence throughout history. The main differences between the past and the current
situation, however, are the shifting sociospatial constellations where the state increasingly
relies on private security assemblages to uphold their coercive functions, often with links
to former military personnel and transnational security firms. The violent repression of
popular opposition to extractive industries can be understood as part of a broader political
project borne by multiple agencies of the state with the participation of the private sector,
driven by a myriad of interests and aiming at neutralizing oppositional politics - or what
Pearce (2018) conceptualizes as a “fragmented security state.”
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Chapter four: From the streets to the courts: Mobilizing the law to subvert
hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles
1. Introduction
In Guatemala, different types of community referendums (e.g. consultas
comunitarias, autoconsultas, consultas de buena fe, consultas de vecinos etc.) have
become one of the most common tools for resisting mining and hydropower projects. In
fact, Guatemala is the country with the most community referendums on extractive
projects to have taken place in Latin America (Walter & Urkidi, 2017). Through these
mechanisms, grassroots movements have increasingly been able to assert the rights of
mining-affected communities and indigenous people to self-determination in
environmental decision-making and natural resource management, questioning the
legitimacy of dominant ideas about development and human-environment relations.
While those involved in resistance against environmental injustices may predominantly
belong to groups that are vulnerable to marginalization, they are also capable of
transformative social mobilization (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015; Rodríguez Garavito &
Santos, 2005). The participants in these environmental struggles use a wide array of
strategies and tactics to resist extractive projects. They organize community referendums,
stage demonstrations and set up roadblocks. They mobilize transnational advocacy
networks and collaborate with international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
religious groups. Activists also increasingly deploy legal discourses and mechanisms as
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part of their political and social struggles, using ‘the law’ to expand the political spaces
available to them for transformative politics (Rajagopal, 2003; Sieder, 2010, 2011)16,
which is the focus of our paper.
Our paper focuses on the ways in which anti-mining movements in Guatemala
mobilize ‘the law’ in attempts to subvert hegemonic power relations in environmental
struggles. We examine why subaltern actors increasingly turn to the law and legal
mechanisms, as well as the particular ways in which these actors mobilize the law in their
struggles. We wish to contribute to ongoing debates on the possibilities and limitations of
the law in expanding the conditions of possibility for marginalized groups engaged in
environmental struggles (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015; Rodríguez Garavito & Santos, 2005;
Santos, 2002; Sieder, 2011; Walter & Urkidi, 2017)..
There is an emerging jurisprudence in Guatemala that acknowledges the principle
of prior consultation, particularly with regard to indigenous rights. In 2015, the
Guatemalan Constitutional Court ordered the suspension of a hydropower project in
Nebaj (Vega I and Vega II) for failure to consult affected indigenous communities prior
to the installation of th project (Price, 2015). In 2017, Oxec I and Oxec II, another
hydropower project in Alta Verapaz, had its licenses temporarily suspended for the same
reason but resumed operations after a contested state-led consultation processes was
carried out (Herrera, 2017). Mining projects have also been suspended, and in 2016, the
Guatemalan Supreme Court of Justice ordered the definitive suspension of the “El

16

In Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen and Bull (forthcoming) we observe the ways in which, in
Guatemala, corporations and the state react to contentious environmental politics with - “lawfare”
– “the resort to legal instruments…to commit acts of political coercion” (Comaroff & Comaroff,
2006, p. 30)
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Tambor” mining project for failing to consult affected communities prior to the projects
installment (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017; Pitán, 2016). In July 2017, Guatemala’s
Constitutional Court suspended the licenses of the country’s now largest mine, the
Escobal mine in San Rafael Las Flores, again citing inadequate prior consultation of
affected indigenous communities. In September 2018, the Constitutional Court ordered
the Ministry of Energy and Mines to carry out consultations in the areas surrounding the
Escobal mine. This verdict17 is considered a huge victory for environmental and
indigenous activists in Guatemala and their ongoing struggle against extractive industries
in the country.
Environmental activists frame strategic legal action and the mobilization of legal
discourses as an attempt to legitimize their right to self-determination in natural resource
management. Legal action is also a strategy used to halt, slow down and cancel extractive
projects. It offers a strategic resource to communities and grassroots movements that
otherwise may lack the means to alter corporate practices, at least through formal,
institutional mechanisms (Kirsch, 2014). Strategic grassroots driven litigation can also
harm corporate and government reputation, damaging profitability, thus making it a
formidable tactic for putting pressure on corporations and governments (Sveinsdóttir,
Aguilar-Støen, & Bull, forthcoming).
The articulations between different scales of law have become more complex,
with increasingly porous boundaries between local, national, and global law giving rise to
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Guatemalan Constitutional Court, Expediente 4785-2017; Expediente 4785-2018. Court
documents available at: https://cc.gob.gt/2018/09/04/resolucion-4785-2017-caso-minera-sanrafael/
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‘legal hybrids’ and new forms of legal meaning and action (Santos, 2002; Sieder, 2017).
Domestic courts in so-called ‘industrialized countries’ are increasingly willing to hear
civil claims against companies that operate in foreign ‘host’ countries (Kirsch, 2014). In
2014, the Norwegian Pension Fund divested from a Canadian mining company for
serious human rights violations against Guatemalan indigenous and environmental
activists. One of those cases was brought to Canadian courts. Two Canadian mining
companies are currently entangled in legal battles on their home turf for violations
they’re accused of committing in Guatemala. In 2017 a shareholder class action was filed
in the United States against a Canadian mining company operating in Guatemala for
failure to adequately inform shareholders about local opposition against the mining
project (Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen and Bull, forthcoming).
In this paper, we examine the growing importance of law, legal institutions and
legal actors to environmental struggles. In doing so, we wish to get at the complex and
dynamic interweaving of law, space, politics and power in struggles for environmental
justice. More specifically, we analyze the ways in which grassroots actors mobilize the
law in an attempt to subvert hegemonic norms and power relations in environmental
struggles (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015; Rodríguez Garavito & Santos, 2005; Sieder, 2007,
2010, 2011). We argue that due to lack of adequate political spaces to advance
environmental struggles, activists have turned to the judiciary as a strategy to expand
their repertoires of contention18. In doing so, they attempt to push open new spaces for
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In social movement therory, a repetoire of contention refers to the different set of means or
‘claims-making routines’ groups have to make claims . The term is attributed ot Charles Tilly
(Della Porta, 2013).
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participation, recognition and distribution in order to access environmental justice (Cf.
Fraser, 2010; Schlosberg, 2007).
The emerging legal strategies adopted by environmental activists in Guatemala
highlight how the many dynamic configurations of environmental struggles are related to
legal processes in lieu of political spaces. The legal cultures we observe in Guatemalan
environmental struggles raise important questions about the dialectics of resistance and
the law, and how these processes shape environmental governance, political participation
and contestation. Those who engage in resistance against extractive projects, some of the
most marginalized groups in Guatemala - indigenous people and the rural poor - are faced
with a climate of hostility and violence, and experience repression and criminalization
aimed at undermining their activism (Global Witness, 2017). Despite this, we find that
environmental struggles in Guatemala reveal how grassroots mobilizations can - however
modestly - subvert hegemonic power relations in their struggles for environmental justice
and transformative politics.
Our analysis draws on data gathered through fieldwork from 2013-2017, using
primarily qualitative research methods such as interviews, observant participation and
document analysis. Our analysis includes the perspectives from a wide range of diverse
actors, including indigenous leaders, environmental activists, and rural small holding
farmers involved in anti-extractive movements, as well as the legal advisors representing
them, and allied organizations. We also interviewed corporate representatives, groups and
associations that promote private sector interests, lawyers, public servants, as well as
powerful political and economic elites. Participant observation with the aforementioned
actors included visits to projects sites and participation in private sector conferences, as
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well as participating in anti-extractive demonstrations, meetings and public court
hearings.
Following this introduction, the paper is outlined as follows: the second section
presents some theoretical considerations for understanding the emancipatory and
constraining elements of the law and of engaging in contentious politics through legal
mechanisms. The third section examines why subaltern actors increasingly turn to the law
in their struggles. The fourth section then analyzes the ways in which the Guatemalan
anti-mining movement has mobilized the law in its endeavors. Finally, a discussion and
conclusion are presented.
2. Theoretical considerations: The emancipatory and regulatory dimensions of law
Law configures social space in ways that has consequences for justice and
injustice in the world (Delaney, 2016, p. 268). It can be understood as constitutive of
social reality in the naïve sense that the operation of law as a force in the world causes
things to happen. “Law is all over” (Sarat, 1990, p. 343). It is constitutive of the
institutional world within which we act. It is literally constitutive of the nation state, the
community, the firm, the market, the family and nature (Blomley, Delaney, & Ford,
2001, p. xv). It is the inscription of rules and regulations, the recognition or withholding
of rights, and enactment of the privileges of authority at all scales. Law draws lines,
constructs insides and outsides, assigns legal meanings to lines, and attaches legal
consequences to crossing them. Law defines certain types of personhood and identities
(citizens, lovers, owners, workers, refugees, children etc.) and as such, it is constitutive of
how lives are enacted and experienced (Delaney, 2015, 2016). Law fixes hegemonic
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visions of nature and ‘appropriate’ human-environment relations, determining access and
control over land, water, the subsoil and natural resources (Sundberg, 2008).
Law is also an instrument of repression and a pervasive means of reproducing
dominant patterns of power relations and hegemony (Sieder, 2011). It is shaped by the
broad social, political-economic structures within which it exists, past and present. These
include, at the least, the dynamic configurations of global capitalism, the international
system of states and organizations (including corporations and international
organizations), and ideological frameworks, such as colonialism, racism, and
neoliberalism (Delaney, 2016; Sundberg, 2008). Law can be viewed as benefitting the
interests of those in power, such as elites and transnational corporations, because of the
ways in which legal practices privilege those who can most potently play by the rules of
the game. Corporate capitalism and elites often successfully mobilize ‘lawfare19’ to
further their political and economic ends, while those who act in the name of the state
mobilize lawfare when they conjure with legalities to act against its citizens, often
through criminalization and repression (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006). Some scholars see
law as depoliticizing conflict, for example by regulations that prevent labor from
engaging in civil resistance or provoking radical change (Eckert et al., 2012, p. 4) or
through a “fetishism of the law,” whereby the central role of politics is displaced to the
courts (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006, p. 49). Similarly, some postcolonial scholars
argue that the law alienates subalterns from their own languages and experiences (Das,
1989; Kirsch, 2012).

19

“Lawfare” is “the resort to legal instruments…to commit acts of political coercion” (Comaroff
& Comaroff, 2006, p. 30)
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And yet, law can also be an instrument of change and resistance, and a means by
which justice might be realized through counterhegemonic struggles (Blomley et al.,
2001; Rodríguez Garavito & Santos, 2005; Santos, 2002). Law, in particular rights
related norms and instruments, holds out an emancipatory promise to people across the
world. This emancipatory promise that has long been invoked by oppressed peoples, for
example, appeals to citizenship by those, such as women and slaves, who were
systematically denied formal citizenship rights (Sieder, 2011, pp. 240–241). The law is
not static. It is not a closed system without contingency, inevitably reproducing
hegemonic power relations. Rather, law is open-ended, and legal rules and concepts are
open to interpretation (Kirsch, 2014). Even as they are “fixed”, at least partially, in
specific legal instruments, interpretations and meanings are subject to ongoing
contestation and reinterpretation by different actors. This is particularly evident where
international norms and rights discourses are used or invoked to challenge national laws
and situated practices. Legal systems and engagements with the law can be understood as
contested sites of meaning where dominant ideals and values provide the framework for
contestation and for advancing alternative understandings and practices. In this way, law
is constantly negotiated and reshaped in a dynamic dialectic between hegemonic
projections and counterhegemonic actions (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015; Rodríguez Garavito
& Santos, 2005; Santos, 2002; Sieder, 2011). This is not to suggest that legal strategies
are a panacea for those engaged in environmental struggles. We are acutely aware of the
irreducible complexity of the dialectics of resistance and the law (Comaroff & Comaroff,
2006; Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015). We understand that without dismantling systems of
oppression that produce and reproduce socio-spatial inequalities to begin with, law will
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likely favor those who benefit from such systems to begin with. Yet, as Green (2002)
points out, subaltern groups do not mobilize at a distance from the institutional and
symbolic modalities through which hegemony is constructed, but rather in and through
these (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015). Consequently, the institutions, discourses, and
technologies of rule that attach to the state also become sites of contention where
subaltern resistance can be articulated and pursued (Gramsci, 1998, p. 52). The work of
grassroots actors and social movements engaged in counterhegemonic resistance
highlighting these instances, which relates to the questions we raise in our paper, namely,
how grassroots actors engaged in environmental struggles are able to mobilize through
these ‘legal’ forms of political action (Nilsen, 2012). Finally, it is important to point out
that we do not see the mobilization of the law as replacing collective action and civil
resistance in contentious politics and environmental struggles. Rather, we see strategic,
grassroots driven litigation and counterhegemonic legal resistance as forming part of
broader political struggles and complementing existing repertoires of contention
(Rodríguez Garavito & Santos, 2005, p. 15).
3. Changing legal opportunity structures and growing rights consciousness
To understand why subaltern actors involved in environmental struggles
increasingly include legal discourses and legal mechanisms as part of their repertoires of
contention we need to first look to recent global and national developments. The last
couple of decades have seen the global spread of international human rights norms in
tandem with the increasing incorporation of social, economic and cultural rights into
national constitutions (Sieder, 2011; Tate & Vallinder, 1995). At the same time, changes
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in legal and regulatory frameworks stemming from decentralization processes have
transformed the ways in which the citizens, corporations and the state engage with and
through the law. Constitutional courts and supreme courts are also more active in
counterbalancing the executive and legislative than ever before, and high courts have
begun to recast themselves as defenders of rights, intervening in political and social
conflicts (Couso, Huneeus, & Sieder, 2010; Sieder, Schjolden, & Angell, 2009). As a
result, subaltern actors and grassroots movements increasingly draw on rights-based
discourses and incorporate legal strategies into their political struggles. This growing
‘rights consciousness’, that is, ‘a willingness, or eagerness, to make use of institutions
(like courts) which enforce rights, or which decide when rights have been infringed on or
broken’ (Friedman, 2002, p. 38) is a key factor in explaining the growth of strategic
litigation as part of political and social struggle. The combination of new legal
opportunity structures and growing rights consciousness means that processes of
grassroots driven legal action – or legal action ‘from below’ – are now taking place in a
range of different contexts and across scales (Sieder, 2011, p. 241).
In Guatemala, these developments are shaped by, among other things, legislative
and political changes related to post-war democratization, as well as the profound
reshaping of the relations between state, market and citizens stemming from economic
liberalization favoring a minimalist state (Sveinsdóttir et al., forthcoming). These changes
included the increasing codification of the collective rights of indigenous peoples, as well
as the implementation of decentralization legislation intended to strengthen
‘participation’ of civil society actors in local decision-making processes by transferring
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certain responsibilities from central to ‘lower’ administrative levels, such as departments,
municipalities and communities (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Sieder, 2011; Urkidi, 2011).
Decentralization legislation also transferred responsibilities relating to
environmental governance from the state and to the private sector. For example, the
responsibility of evaluating and mitigating the potential impacts of projects through the
undertaking of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) now lies with project owners,
as well as the facilitation of citizen participation in such processes. Tensions between
these contradictory ideas about participation, rights and environmental governance sees
affected communities generating counterhegemonic, grassroots driven forms of
environmental governance practices, such as community referendums, and challenging
hegemonic notions of ‘participation’ through their contestation of EIAs and technocratic,
market-driven ideas about Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) (Aguilar-Støen &
Hirsch, 2015, 2017). As they do, they increasingly draw on legal discourses and
mechanisms to advance their claims.
There are several legal instruments and norms that are of particular importance to
public participation in environmental decision-making in Guatemala, and which relate to
mobilizations against extractive industries. Relating to the collective rights of indigenous
peoples is, most importantly, the International Labour Organization’s Convention
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 169) (ILO 169 hereafter) ratified by
Guatemala in 199620. Guatemala’s Decentralization Law (Decree 14-2002), Municipal
Code (Decree 12-2002), and Urban and Rural Development Council Law (Decree 1120

Guatemala is also a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP) and the Organization of the Americas’ (OAS) American Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, these figure less significantly in our analysis.
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2002) all regulate citizen participation in local decision-making processes and play an
important role in community referendums. The legal and regulatory frameworks of the
Guatemalan mining and energy sectors are also of importance. Of particular importance
for our case are the Mining Law (Decree 48-97), regulating mining activities, and the
General Law of Electricity (Decree 93-96), which regulates hydropower activities. The
Regulation of Environmental Evaluation, Control and Monitoring (Ministry of
Environment and Natural Resources, Government Agreement 137-2016) is also of
importance as is applies to EIAs and FPIC.
3.1. Decentralization and citizen participation
Growing rights consciousness, alongside legislative and regulatory changes
stemming from domestic-level decentralization shape the contested terrain of
environmental governance (Walter & Urkidi, 2017). These changes have transformed the
ways in which citizens, corporations and the state engage with one another. Legislative
changes also impact new opportunity structures from within which grassroots actors and
social movements mobilize the law to advance their claims (Domingo, 2010). In
Guatemala, decentralization reforms were first proposed in the 1980s and then later
during the peace process in the 1990s. Decentralization was proposed not only as a way
to improve governance and institutional service delivery, but also to grant indigenous
people more political autonomy, as well as to increase citizen participation (Costanza,
2016). A range of actors including domestic elites, international donors,
intergovernmental organizations, international financial institutions, civil society and
indigenous movements took part in these reformations, often attempting to advance
conflicting visions of the state and governance. Some laws and policies were crafted with
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strong influence from the private sector21, whereas others responded to pressure from
civil society and development cooperation agencies (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen
& Hirsch, 2017; Dougherty, 2011).
Decentralization legislation was approved by the Guatemalan Congress in 2002
and was articulated in three laws: The General Law of Decentralization (Decree 142002), the Municipal Code (Decree 12-2002), and the Urban and Rural Development
Council Law (Decree 11-2002). These laws included measures to formalize citizen
participation in local government by establishing community-level and municipal-level
‘Development Councils,’ and granting the right to community consultation, both
indigenous and non-indigenous. The Municipal Code (Decree 12-2002) refers to
community consultation in the following terms: Article 17 confers on residents the right
to participate in consultations in accordance with the law, as well as the right to demand
public consultation of issues that are of great importance to the municipality. On the basis
of Article 63, the Municipal Council (COMUDE), through a two-thirds majority of all its
members, can decide to hold a consultation (…) “when the importance of an issue
suggests the need to consult the opinion of the residents” (Municipal Code, Decree 122002, Article 63). In addition, residents have the right, through the signatures of at least
10% of the residents registered in the municipality, to demand that consultation be held
on issues of a general nature that affect all the residents of the municipality. “The results
would be binding if at least twenty per cent (20%) of the registered residents participate
and the majority of the votes in favour of the issue under consultation” (Municipal Code,
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See Dougherty (2011) and Aguilar-Støen (2015) for an analysis of how the private sector
played an influential role in the drafting of the 1997 Mining Law.
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Decree 12-2002, Article 64). Finally, the Municipal Code also contains specific
regulations regarding consultations in such cases where the issue at hand particularly
affects the rights of and interests of indigenous communities and authorities in a given
municipality. In such cases, “the Municipal Council will carry out consultation at the
request of the indigenous communities or authorities, while taking into consideration the
specific criteria determined by the customs and traditions of the said indigenous
communities” (Municipal Code, Decree 12-2002, Article 65).
With respect to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in the matter, the
High Court has ruled that the right to conduct consultation procedures on issues of
community interests lies with the Municipal Council. It also declared that a lack of
internal legislation in that respect “cannot lead to this right being nullified”
(Constitutional Court, Record 1408-2005). For the most part, the Court has ruled that
community referendums are non-binding (The Observatory, 2015, p. 14). However, in
2013, the Constitutional Court set an important legal precedent when it recognized the
results of the Mataquescuintla municipal consultation as legally binding22. This was the
first time the Constitutional Court considered the results of a community referendum
regarding a mining project as binding. Since then Guatemala has witnessed a rapidly
evolving jurisprudence with important and precedent setting cases such the Escobal case,
which we shall discuss in more detail later in the paper.
Much of the literature on the Guatemalan anti-mining movement describes antimining mobilizations as indigenous struggles, which indeed they are, particularly in the
Western Highlands (Laplante & Nolin, 2014; Nolin & Stephens, 2010; Sieder, 2007,
22
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2011; Yagenova & Garcia, 2009). However, anti-mining struggles in Guatemala are far
from monolithic and include indigenous and non-indigenous groups alike, particularly in
southeastern Guatemala (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Walter & Urkidi, 2017). As such,
community-consulting processes are heterogeneous, with non-indigenous communities
drawing on the Municipal Code and the Development Council Law, whereas indigenous
communities also appeal to the ILO Convention 169. This makes the Guatemalan case
interesting among other things, because of the synergies between multi-ethnic antimining movements, the COCODES, and the COMUDES in the organization of
consultations (Urkidi, 2011; Walter & Urkidi, 2017).
3.2. Indigenous justice and the ILO Convention 169
In Guatemala official multiculturalism and indigenous justice remain weak
(Sieder, 2007, 2011, 2017). Rather than reflecting an organic process generated in
response to a consolidated mass movement of indigenous peoples, the incorporation of
indigenous justice into Guatemalan national law is best understood as a consequence of
an internationally brokered peace process (Sieder, 2007, 2011). The impact of thirty-six
years of civil war, in particular the counterinsurgency warfare inflicted upon the civilian
population during the early 1980s, had a devastating effect on popular organization
(Brett, 2016; Sieder, 2011). Guatemala’s civil war, which lasted from 1960 to 1996,
produced some of Latin America’s most terrible instances of state terror that culminated
in acts of genocide. Counterinsurgency warfare saw more than 200,000 people murdered
during the war, the majority of which were non-combatant indigenous Maya. Another
50,000 people were disappeared, their whereabouts unknown and their bodies buried in
clandestine graves throughout the country (CEH, 2012; ODAH, 1998). The widespread
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operationalization of disappearances became a signature tactic of the Guatemalan military
and was used to terrorize, punish and silence the civilian population (Brett, 2016).
Guatemala’s state formation was one that combined democracy with virulent anticommunist counterinsurgency, which built on long-evolving patterns of rural repression
and deeply embedded racism that served to organize unequal socio-spatial relations in
colonial and postcolonial Guatemala (Brett, 2016; Casaús Arzú, 2010). To this day
counterinsurgency structures remain incorporated into the very heart of the Guatemalan
state and continue to condition individual and collective actions (Sieder, 2011;
Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen, and Bull, forthcoming).
The signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, which marked the end of the war, did
little to address many of the root causes of the civil war, such as inequality, highly
skewed land distribution, deeply rooted racism and the exclusion of the indigenous
population from civil and political participation (Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen, and Bull,
forthcoming). Nonetheless, the Peace Accords offered fairly strong support of
multiculturalism and indigenous rights, and the peace process resulted in significant
agreements between the government and guerrillas designed to respect indigenous rights
and recognition (Sieder, 2011). One of the promises of the Peace Accords was that the
government would reform the Constitution to recognize indigenous peoples’ right to
exercise their own ‘customary’ law (Sieder, 2011). However, the required constitutional
reforms never materialized. In May 1999, a national referendum - the ‘Consulta Popular’
– rejected the reforms proposed in the Peace Accords, leaving hard-won concessions
from the state on issues like indigenous rights and reforms to the military in limbo
(McAllister & Nelson, 2013; Sieder, 2007, 2011, 2017). A sustained campaign by the
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powerful right-wing elite and the private sector alleged that recognizing indigenous law
would “balkanize” the country and encourage “reverse discrimination” against the nonindigenous (Sieder, 2017, p. 371). The failure of the ‘Consulta Popular’ suggests that the
rights of indigenous people to exercise their own forms of authority and law remain
unrecognized23 (Sieder, 2007, p. 219). The failure to recognize ‘customary law’ in the
Constitution means that decisions made by indigenous authorities could be overturned by
the courts claiming indigenous law is unconstitutional, since the Constitution gives
exclusive jurisdiction to the judiciary. In the absence of constitutional reform, indigenous
justice, remains extremely weak in Guatemala (Sieder, 2007, p. 219).
Nonetheless, the ratification of the ILO Convention 169 by the Guatemalan
Congress in 1996 provided legal basis for the official recognition of indigenous rights:24
“Rights guaranteed by the Convention include equality of opportunity and treatment,
protections of indigenous peoples’ religion and spiritual values and customs, rights to
ownership and possession of traditionally valued lands, and rights to appropriate
forms of health and educational provisions” (Sieder, 2010, p. 166).
The Convention also commits governments to recognizing the jurisdictional
autonomy of indigenous peoples and their right to administer their own forms of justice,
as long as they respect fundamental and internationally recognized human rights (Sieder,
2011, p. 247). The Convention also states the right of indigenous peoples to prior
consultation on development projects affecting their livelihoods (Sieder, 2011, p. 248).
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Sieder has written extensively about judicial reform, access to justice and legal pluralities in
Guatemala. We refer to her work for those interested in a more thorough reading of such prosses
in Guatemala. See (Sieder, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2017).
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For an indepth discussion of the ILO Convention 169 in Guatemala see (Xiloj, 2016)
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The ILO Convention 169 is the first international instrument dealing with
indigenous people’s rights that is binding on its signatory states, and as such the
Convention has been binding to the state of Guatemala since its ratification in April 1996
(Sieder, 2007, 2011; The Observatory, 2015). In the absence of the constitutional reforms
needed to recognize ‘customary law,’ indigenous actors and their allies have increasingly
pursued other avenues to obtain recognition, including by bringing cases before the
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, arguing that Guatemala’s ratification of the
ILO Convention 169 commits the state to recognize indigenous autonomy for communal
governance. The Constitutional Court has issued several rulings reaffirming the legality
of the measures applied by indigenous authorities, establishing an emergent jurisprudence
favouring the jurisdictional autonomy of indigenous peoples (Sieder, 2017, p. 371).
3.3. The Mining Law, EIAs and public participation
The legal and regulatory framework of the Guatemalan mining sector reflects the
market logic of post-war economic liberalization and decentralization. As previously
mentioned, one of the results of decentralization was the transferal of responsibilities
relating to environmental governance were from the state to the private sector. Under
Guatemala’s 1997 Mining Law (Decree 48-97), companies seeking mining concessions
and exploitation licenses must complete an EIA to be evaluated by the Ministry of
Environment and Natural Resources (known by its acronym in Spanish, MARN), which
is the public agency responsible for the approval of the EIA. The current EIA process is
regulated under the 2016 Regulations on Environmental Evaluation, Control and
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Monitoring25, which stipulate that responsibility of carrying out the EIA falls on the
mining company itself, although the EIA process must follow the MARN guidelines. The
EIA regulations also confer the responsibility of facilitating public participation of
communities affected by mining projects onto mining companies themselves, shifting this
responsibility from the state to private actors (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen &
Hirsch, 2015, 2017). Once an EIA is completed it is to be made public for 30 days at the
MARN, located in the capital city. A notice is given to the public that an EIA has been
submitted and is available for comment. In practice this usually means publishing a
notice in a newspaper or on the radio. Recently, EIAs under review have also become
available on the MARN website26, but the layout is cumbersome and EIAs are only
available in Spanish27. While the EIA regulations state that affected communities should
be included throughout the entire EIA process28, this is rarely the case in Guatemala, and
the only ‘formal’ space available to challenge the EIA’s is during the 30-day comment
period (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017; Amnesty International, 2014). A group of U.S.
engineers that were solicited to independently audit several Guatemalan mining EIAs
reported that the 30-day comment period on exploitation licenses and EIAs is far too
short. The briefness of the comment period handicaps government agencies and the
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Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Government Agreement 137-2016.
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There are at least 22 languages spoken in Guatemala and many of the speakers of those
languages do not speak Spanish or have Spanish as a second or third language.
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Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Government Agreement 137-2016, article 43.
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public from providing thorough and thoughtful response. The engineers concluded that
the period should be several months long (Robinson, Lauderman, & Montgomery, 2012).
It is well documented that practices of EIAs in Guatemala are rife with
irregularities and deficiencies, and often, outright duplicity and manipulation on behalf of
mining companies29. For example, in the landmark conflict surrounding the Marlin mine,
consultations took place largely after the company completed its EIA, and long after the
mine’s concession was issued in 1996 (Amnesty International, 2014). In 2005, the
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) of the International Finance Corporation of the
World Bank carried out an assessment of the Marlin mining conflict, noting that “public
disclosure prepared by the company – including the [EIA] – were highly technical and
did not at the time have sufficient information to allow for an informed view of the likely
adverse impacts of the project” (Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman
International Finance Corporation, 2005, p. ii). In 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on
the Rights of Indigenous peoples concluded that there had been no consultation in the
case of the Marlin mine that conformed to applicable international standards such the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Anaya, 2011, p. 31).
Consultation processes were also far from satisfactory in the case of the ‘Tambor’
mining project30, where affected communities only found out about the project after the
exploitation license was granted (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017, p. 229). The Escobal
29

For a more thorough discussion see Aguilar-Støen (2015), Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch (2015,
2017).
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Popularly referred to as ‘La Puya’ - the name of the movement that opposes the “El Tambor Progreso VII Derivada” mining project. See (Pedersen, 2014, 2018) for thorough discussion on
the La Puya resistance.
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mining conflict in southeastern Guatemala follows similar patters to the Marlin and
Tambor projects. Affected communities reported that they were neither involved in
public participation nor consulted. In fact, from day one, the Escobal project was
characterized by a lack of transparency on behalf of the mining company and affected
populations claim they were never fully informed about the plans surrounding the project
(Solano, 2015b). In addition to compliance failures regarding public participation
requirements, all of the EIAs for the three mining projects were found to have serious
shortcomings with regard to evaluations of potential environmental impacts, particularly
with regard to water issues (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017; Robinson et al., 2012).
It is safe to say that EIA practices in the Guatemalan mining sector have
precluded any type of meaningful participation, consultation or consent from affected
communities, non-indigenous and indigenous alike. Not only are EIAs shrouded by a lack
of transparency, they are often used as a technical device to delimit and control public
participation. EIAs are also almost invariably in Spanish, and EIAs are, by their nature,
largely technical document (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2015, p. 478). Out of frustration
with being excluded from having a say in processes that affect their territories, their
livelihoods, and their cultural survival, affected communities increasingly react by
contesting hegemonic environmental governance practices, such as EIAs, by creating
their own mechanisms for governance and political action.
In the following section we analyze the ways in which communities affected by
mining projects have responded to exclusion from environmental decision-making
processes. While decentralization has meant that the responsibility of facilitating public
participation of affected communities falls upon the private sector, national laws
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governing participation, as well as international instruments safeguarding indigenous
rights, allow affected communities to have a say in environmental governance. While
these results are often contradictory and conflicting, new forms of political action are
shaping an emergent jurisprudence of mining conflicts.
4. Community consultations and citizen participation as counterhegemonic
resistance
Since the early 2000s, unprecedented environmental struggles led by strong
grassroots movements have emerged in response to the imposition of mining and
hydroelectric projects in Guatemala (Aguilar-Støen, 2016). These grassroots movements
include some of the most marginalized groups in Guatemala – indigenous people and the
rural poor. Their resistance addresses a range of interrelated concerns, including claims to
political autonomy; the rights to lands and territories; the unjust burden of environmental
risk and degradation; the politics of livelihood and cultural survival.
The previous sections of the paper outlined an analytic framework for
understanding both why and how anti-mining movements mobilize the law. Our aim is to
argue that, using grassroots driven, counterhegemonic mechanism of environmental
governance, subaltern actors attempt to subvert hegemonic power relations in
environmental struggles. People affected by mining related environmental injustices
resist their exclusion from environmental governance by creating ‘hybrid-mechanisms for
participation,’ (Cf. Walter & Urkidi, 2017, p. 276) and by constructing ‘alternative legal
orders’ (Sieder, 2017, p. 15). In this following section, we analyze the evolving political
actions of three anti-mining movements that are of importance to the emergent
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Guatemalan jurisprudence of public participation and consultation. We examine how
these actors have mobilized to develop political tools and grassroots-driven mechanisms
for environmental governance, political participation and political contestation.
4.1 The Guatemalan anti-mining movement
The first transnational mining project in Guatemala was the El Estor nickel mine,
which was operated from 1977 to 1982 by the International Nickel Company of Canada,
Ltd. (INCO) through its Guatemalan subsidiary, EXMIBAL. During the lifetime of the
mine, the army and mining personnel committed severe human rights violations against
the area’s residents (CEH, 2012; Fox, 2015; Nolin & Stephens, 2010; Solano, 2005,
2005; Urkidi, 2011). The project, which is in the Izabal region, was revived in 1994 as
the ‘Fenix project’ and has since then changed hands between different Canadian mining
companies, most recently being acquired by a Russian company. The project continues to
be plagued with accounts of terrible human rights violations and violent evictions
(Crystal, Imai, & Maheandiran, 2014; Fox, 2015; Nolin & Stephens, 2010). However, it
is the emergence of the Marlin mine in 2003 that marks the starting point of the current
cycle of mining conflicts in Guatemala (Urkidi, 2011, p. 563). Residents in the
municipalities affected by the mine, San Juan Ixtahuacán and Sipakapa, located in the
San Marcos department, were neither adequately informed nor consulted prior to the
construction of the mine. In response an anti-mining movement then began to take shape
between December 2004 and January 2005 as construction of the mine was underway
(Dougherty, 2011). The conflict began to escalate when in December 2004 a group of
indigenous anti-mining activist and rural farmers organized a blockade in Los Encuentros
in Sololá. For more than thirty days the group blocked mining equipment from
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proceeding to the mining site in San Marcos. However, the blockade came to an end in
January 2005 when the Guatemalan government called in security forces to escort the
equipment convoy to the mine. At the time, Guatemalan President Oscar Berger was
widely reported saying, “we have to protect the investors” (Nolin & Stephens, 2010). The
police and military fiercely repressed the anti-mining protesters, resulting in the death of
Raúl Castro Boce, a member of the group, and the injuries of sixteen other people
(Dougherty, 2011; Eccarius‐Kelly, 2007; Nolin & Stephens, 2010; Yagenova & Garcia,
2009). Following the events in Los Encuentros the opposition against the Marlin mine
began to gain broader notice within Guatemala and the anti-mining movement began to
spread.
4.2 The Sipakapa community referendum
In 2005, Sipakapa became the first municipality to carry out a community
consultation on mining in Guatemala, a process that became a milestone in the history of
contemporary anti-mining movements in Guatemala (Urkidi, 2011; Yagenova & Garcia,
2009). Following the events at Los Encuentros, the municipal authorities of Sipakapa
announced that they would hold a public consultation on the mining operations, based on
the Municipal Code and the ILO 169. The consultation was to be carried out through
open community assemblies in different villages according to “indigenous customary
law.” The mining company immediately tried to obstruct the process by submitting an
injunction to order the municipality to postpone the proceedings. However, the
Constitutional Court rejected the appeal. The pressure from the mining company caused
municipal authorities to temporarily back down from their plans to go through with the
public consultation. However, the local COCODE – established by the 2002
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decentralization legislation - carried the consultation regardless on June 18, 2005 (Sieder,
2010, p. 174; Sieder, 2011). Eleven out of the thirteen villages that participated in the
referendum voted against mining, one in favour and the other abstained (Gramajo Bauer,
2011; Sieder, 2010, p. 174).
Following the community consultation, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM)
(the government institution responsible for the granting of mining licenses) filed an
injunction to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the community consultation was
unconstitutional. Two years later, in 2007, the Constitutional Court ruled that COMUDEs
and municipalities do indeed have the right to conduct consultation procedures on issues
of community interests. However, the Court found the community consultation nonbinding because such conventions and laws were imprecise and not in accordance with
the constitution (Walter & Urkidi, 2017; Xiloj & Porras, 2008). Yet, the Court also
declared that a lack of internal legislation in that respect “cannot lead to this right being
nullified31.”
Because the Constitutional Court found the results of the Sipakapa consultation to be
non-binding, the mine continued to operate from 2005 to 2017, remaining controversial
and contested throughout its lifetime32. However, the importance of the Sipakapa process
to the Guatemalan anti-mining movement cannot be understated. The Sipakapa
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In 2010, after a study conducted by the activist group Physicians for Human Rights determined
that the mine posed serious health risks to the communities living downstream, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights called for the suspension of the mine. The state initially
indicated that it would comply with the precautionary measure but subsequently petitioned the
court to allow the mine to continue operating (Kirsch, 2014, p. 291).
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consultation process set in motion what has become one of the most important
mechanisms used by subaltern actors involved in environmental struggles in Guatemala.
4.3 The ‘La Puya’ resistance and the Tambor mining project
The ‘La Puya’ resistance refers to an anti-mining movement that opposes the ‘El
Tambor - Progreso VII Derivada’ mine, located in the municipalities of San Pedro
Ayampuc and San José del Golfo, 20 km north of Guatemala City (Aguilar-Støen &
Hirsch, 2017). Here, again, communities affected by the mine were excluded from public
participation processes mandated by the EIA regulations and the ILO 169. By the time
the affected communities found out about the project, the 30-day comments period,
stipulated by the EIA regulations, was already over, making it too late to challenge the
EIA (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017). The project’s exploitation license was granted in
November 2011 and in February 2012 construction of the mine began. Because of the
attention garnered by the Marlin conflict, a national anti-mining movement had started to
develop in Guatemala. By 2012 increasing knowledge about mining resistance began to
spread as nascent activist-networks increasingly shared their experiences of collective
resistance against mining. In March 2012, the peaceful encampment of La Puya was
established at the entrance of the El Tambor mine site (Pedersen, 2018). The La Puya
resistance movement managed to maintain its peaceful blockade at the entrance of the
mine until the mine’s license was suspended in 2016, successfully disturbing the
operations of the mine – although such successes came at a great cost, with members of
the movement suffering violence, repression and criminalization (Pedersen, 2018).
In 2014, the La Puya movement initiated processes of legal action against the
mining project. In August that year, members of the anti-mining movement, working
82

with a domestic environmental NGO, brought a case against the MEM and its sitting
minister, Erick Archila. The case cited failure to comply with public participation
regulations during the EIA process and failure to consult with indigenous peoples
affected by the project, as established by the ILO 169. In October of that same year,
community members from El Carrizal and El Guapinol in San Pedro Ayampuc also filed
an injunction against the COMUDE for allowing the construction of a mining project
without guaranteeing proper consultation and protecting the interests of affected
communities (Pedersen, 2018). Finally, in July 2015, the La Puya movement achieved a
considerable victory when a Guatemalan appeals court ruled in favor of residents right to
prior consultation (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017). The mining company was ordered to
suspend all construction activities until a community consultation was held. However, the
company ignored the court ruling and continued operations. In February 2016, the
Guatemalan Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision of the appeals court, giving notice of
the suspension of the mine’s license based on the lack of consultation with indigenous
peoples in the area. Yet again, the mine continued to operate despite its license being
suspended. Then in March 2016, the MEM enforced the injunction suspending the
mining company’s license. Finally, in August 2016, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
suspension of the Tambor mining license due to lack of free, prior and informed consent
of indigenous peoples in the area33 (Pedersen, 2018). Since then the Tambor mining
project remains suspended but has been caught up in scandals and charges, relating, for
example, to stolen Mayan archeological artifacts and ties to corruption scandals.
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Guatemalan Supreme Court (Corte Suprema de Justicia, Amparo 1246-2016).
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The 2016 suspension of the Tambor mining license is important because it was
the first time Guatemalan courts ruled that an exploitation license be suspended for
failure to consult indigenous communities in environmental decision-making processes.
The case of La Puya shows how anti-mining movements can use the courts to contest
EIAs and environmental governance practices and claim back their right to participate in
decision-making processes, however modestly (Aguilar-Støen & Hirtsch, 2017).
4.4 The Escobal mine and the anti-mining movement in southeastern Guatemala
The Escobal mining concession is located in the municipality of San Rafael Las
Flores, about 73 kilometers east of Guatemala City, in the department of Santa Rosa.
Rumors of the proposed mine began to circulate when in 2007 exploration licenses were
granted to a Canadian mining company and preliminary mineral exploration began in the
area. The exploration licenses extended into the municipalities of San Rafael Las Flores
and Casillas in the department of Santa Rosa, the municipalities of San Carlos Alzatate
and Mataquescuintla in Jalapa, and San José Pinula in the department of Guatemala. All
in all the mining concession includes over twenty-three licenses that expand into the
department of Santa Rosa, Jalapa and Jutiapa.
Residents in the municipalities affected by the mine’s operations expressed that,
from the start, they were never fully informed about the mining project. In late 2009, a
group of residents in San Rafael Las Flores met to get informed and discuss the potential
impacts of the mine, which led to the founding of the Committee in Defense of Life and
Peace (CDP). Following the lead from San Rafael Las Flores, residents in neighboring
municipalities began to gather through meetings facilitated by the Catholic Church in
Casillas in order to learn about the rising concerns regarding mining activities in the area.
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Indigenous Xinka communities, forming part of the ‘Parliament of the Xinka People of
Guatemala’ (PAPXGIUA), also joined these discussions. A result of these meetings was
the establishment of the Diocese Commission for the Defence of Nature (CODIDENA),
which brought together the voices of different groups and organizations in the region.
CODIDENA and the CDP worked together to carry out educational and awareness
initiatives in the communities, providing advice about how to hold community
consultations. Later down the road they also helped provide legal support to members of
the anti-mining movement that were facing criminalization by the mining company and
the government (Solano, 2015, pp. 7-8).
One of the strategies used by the anti-mining movement in southeastern
Guatemala was to emphasize the legal right to prior consultation. The Committee for
Defence of Life and Peace, CODIDENA and the Xinka Parliament, aided by two national
NGOs – The Centre for Legal Environmental and Social Action (CALAS) and Madre
Selva – encouraged residents in Casillas, Nueva Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa de Lima and
Mataquescuintla to appeal to their COCODEs and COMUDEs to hold local and
municipal referendums regarding the mining project. In 2011 and 2012, municipal
consultations were held in Nueva Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa de Lima, Casillas and
Mataquescuintla at the request of municipal residents. The consultations were premised
on articles 60-66 of the Municipal Code, as well as Article 28 of the Constitution. All of
the four referendums concluded in a resounding NO to mining. However, no municipal
consultation took place in San Rafael Las Flores, where, despite formal requests from the
population, municipal authorities, who were pro-mining at the time, had refused to hold a
municipal consultation.
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Despite the growing opposition to the mining project and the results of the
municipal referendums, the Escobal EIA was approved by MARN in October 2011,
clearing the way for the construction of the mine. Then, in April 2013, the MEM
announced that it had granted the mineral extraction license for the Escobal project. In
early 2013, both leading up to the granting of the Escobal extraction license and in the
days following it, eight consultations were carried out in the Municipality of San Rafael
Las Flores, using the COCODE law (Decree 11-2002). During this same period the
situation in the area keep escalating, with killings, kidnappings and shootings taking
place between January and April 2013. In May that same year, the Guatemalan
government declared a “state of siege” in the municipalities closest to the mine,
deploying thousands of troops to the area and temporarily suspending constitutional
rights in the region. Otto Perez Molina, the then-president, justified the state of siege –
which can be likened to martial law – on grounds of terrorism and drug trafficking threats
(Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen & Bull, forthcoming).
The state of siege and the criminalization of activists that followed brought a halt
to consultations processes being organized in other communities and municipalities
(Solano, 2015). It took six months before another municipal consultation was carried out
in the municipality of Jalapa. In this referendum, the Xinka communities of Santa María
Xalapán voted overwhelmingly against mining. Finally, in December 2013, the
Constitutional Court set an important legal precedent when it recognized the results of the
2011 Mataquescuintla municipal consultation as legally binding34. This was the first time
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Constitutional Court, Records 4639-2012 and 4646-2012.
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the Constitutional Court of Guatemala considered the results of a community referendum
regarding a mining project as binding. The court’s ruling, which was premised on the
ILO 169 and the Municipal Code, stated “the right of peoples to be consulted is
unquestionable35.”
Nonetheless, the Escobal mine commences commercial production and the antimining movement in southeastern Guatemala faced extraordinary violence, repression
and criminalization, both at the hands of the mine’s private security firm, as well as by
state security forces. The anti-mining movement in San Rafael Las Flores suffered
particularly heavy losses from the repressive measures of the state, and following the
state of siege in 2013 most of the anti-mining movement has been organized from within
the other municipalities in the movement. In June 2017, the anti-mining movement saw a
revival when communities from the areas surrounding the mine established a blockade in
Casillas along the main road to San Rafael Las Flores and the Escobal mine. With the
blockade they were able to halt mine-related traffic and effectively shut down mining
operations. Despite police efforts to break up the blockade, movement members were
able to hold their ground – and continue to do so as we write this in spring 2019. Then in
July 2017, Guatemala’s Supreme Court suspended the mine’s exploitation license, citing
failure to comply with the ILO Convention169 by not consulting the indigenous Xinka
people in the areas surrounding the mine, as well as article 66 of the constitution.36 In
September 2018 the Constitutional Court then recognized the Xinka people’s right to
35

“Es incuestionable el derecho de los pueblos a ser consultados.”
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Constitutional Court, Resolución 4785-2017.
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consultation, reaffirming the suspension of the mining license, until the MEM carries out
a ‘free and informed’ consultation, as established by the ILO 16937.
The case of the anti-mining movement in southeastern Guatemala is important for
several reasons. The Mataquescuintla municipal consultation was the first community
consultation to be found legally binding, establishing a jurisprudence that acknowledges
the peoples unquestionable right to consultation. The Court’s decisions also establish that
community consultations are – in the Court’s eyes – an important mechanism for political
participation and deliberation through which affected communities can make their
opinions heard. The case further reifies that indigenous peoples right to prior consultation
cannot be ignored. The anti-mining movement in southeastern Guatemala is also unique
in the ways it created new forms of political actions and mobilization that cross ethnic
and cultural lines, as well as the ways in which different groups and organizations
worked through and with the COCODEs and the COMUDEs in the organization of
consultations.
5. Conclusion: The contested terrain of environmental governance and hybrid
mechanisms for participation
Throughout this paper we have examined the growing importance of law, legal
institutions and legal actors in anti-mining struggles, analyzing both why and how
environmental activists mobilize through ‘legal’ forms of political action. We argue that
people affected by mining related environmental injustices resist their exclusion from
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environmental decision-making by creating ‘hybrid mechanisms for participation’, such
as community consultations, and by challenging dominant notions of ‘participation’
through their contestation of EIAs and technocratic, market-driven ideas about FPIC.
Changing legal opportunity structures, growing rights consciousness and the
codification of collective indigenous rights have shaped the ways in which environmental
activists develop innovative ‘legal’ strategies, which they use to pry open political spaces
they have historically been excluded from. Changing legal opportunity structures in
Guatemala are shaped by legislative and political changes related to post-war
democratization, as well as the reshaping of the relationships between state, market and
citizens, which stem from economic liberalization that favors a minimalist state. Two
important processes explaining changing legal opportunity structures are the transferal of
environmental governance responsibilities, such as the undertaking of environmental
impact assessment and facilitation of public participation, from the state to the private
sector, as well as the transferal of responsibilities relating to citizen participation in local
decision-making processers from central to ‘lower’ administrative levels. Post-war
political and legislative changes also included the increasing codification of the collective
rights of indigenous peoples, affording indigenous peoples some enforceable rights. Of
particular importance is the ratification of the ILO Convention 169, which is binding to
its signatories and states the right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation on
development projects affecting their livelihoods. However, the failure of the 1999
‘Consulta Popular’ denied indigenous communities their right to ‘customary law’.
Tensions between conflicting and contradictory ideas about citizen participation, and
laws that, on one hand, leave the private sector with the responsibility of EIAs and public
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participation and, on the other hand, laws that acknowledge communities’ right to
participation, as well as indigenous peoples’ right to prior consultation, shape the
contested terrain of environmental governance. Environmental activists maneuver the
constraints and possibilities of these changing legal opportunity structures, drawing in
novel ways on changing legal and regulatory frameworks, such as the decentralization
legislation and the ILO 169, to influence environmental governance and to gain access to
decision making arenas.
In analyzing the evolving political actions of anti-mining movements, we find that
environmental activists challenge dominant notions of ‘participation’ through their
contestations of technocratic EIAs and market-driven ideas about FPIC. They do so to
obtain recognition and to assert the rights of affected communities to self-determination
in environmental decision-making processes, and to unsettle the legitimacy of dominant
ideas about development and human-environment relations. One of the most powerful
ways in which environmental activists are able to challenge their exclusion from
environmental decision-making arenas is by generating grassroots driven forms of
governance practices, such as community referendums, which have become one of the
most common tools for resisting mining development in Guatemala. Walter and Urkidi
(2017, p. 276) argue that community consultations are a political tool and a hybrid
mechanism of participation. Consultations are both a strategic tool of social movements
and an emergent (and contested) participation institution: “Las consultas deben verse solo
desde la perspectiva juridical, sino también desde la politíca.”
Many scholars are skeptical about the idea that rights based, and participatory
discourses can contribute to transformative politics and environmental justice. Charles
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Hale has criticized the multicultural policy model as a project of “neo-liberal
multiculturalism,” which recognizes certain aspects of cultural difference while
advancing economic policies that contradict indigenous rights to autonomy in practice
(Hale, 2002, 2005). Others view ‘state-sponsored multiculturalism’ (Postero, 2007, p. 13)
as a mechanism for the reconstitution of hegemony and legitimacy of weak states and
fragile democracies, rather than signifying a genuine government commitment to
guarantee indigenous rights (Sieder, 2007, 2011). More recently, powerful critiques of
participatory processes such as ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ have emerged as
scholars suggest that FPIC is increasingly used as a mechanism to facilitate and
legitimate development projects, undermining indigenous autonomy (Dunlap, 2018a;
Temper, 2019). The question of whether rights can contribute to the realization of
progressive social transformations is not a new one (Hunt, 1990; Scheingold, 1974). Yet,
as Alan Hunt (1990, p. 325) argues, rights take shape and are constituted by and through
struggle. Thus, rights have the capacity to be elements of emancipation, but are neither a
perfect nor exclusive vehicle for emancipation.
The mobilization of rights can render injustices legible in the idioms of law and
popular legal consciousness (Delaney, 2016; NeJaime, 2011). “Rights that matter are
rights that matter” – substantive enforceable claims such as rights to affordable secure
shelter; rights to dignified employment, rights to a healthy environment, and so on. That
is, rights that impose enforceable obligations on others and substantively reconfigure the
relevant fields of power. These are also rights that under the prevailing conditions across
the world are ‘no-rights.’ In the words of David Delaney (2016, p. 271): “It’s not
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unreasonable to ask, as many have, whether ‘rights’ are the right means to justice. And
it’s reasonable to respond: what else you got?”
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Chapter five: Corporate-community conflicts in Guatemala: Exploring private
sector perspectives on opposition to mining
1. Introduction
In their review of corporate-community conflicts around mining projects, Conde
and Le Billon (2017, p. 693) identify three important gaps in the literature: first, ‘the
internal perspectives of government authorities and mining companies on resistance;
second, the increasing criminalization of dissent by the state and the repression of
resistance by mining companies; and third, there is a need to deepen the knowledge of the
‘micro-politics and psychological dimensions of conflict escalation’ in places where there
are ongoing anti-mining struggles. In this paper I wish to address the first of these gaps
by exploring the perspectives of the Guatemalan private sector on corporate-community
conflicts surrounding opposition to extractive industries. My aim is to contribute to
ongoing discussions, advanced by authors like Aguilar-Støen and Bull (Aguilar-Støen &
Bull, 2016; Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2015, 2016a, 2019), about the ways in which elites and
industry actors shape environmental governance.
Mining conflicts have proliferated throughout Guatemala since the early 2000s,
when the current cycle of mining conflicts started to emerge in response to the
construction of the Marlin mine in the Department of San Marcos. Much of community
opposition to mining revolves around a range of interrelated concerns, including the
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unjust burden of environmental degradation, the risk to rural and land-based livelihoods,
cultural survival, the rights to lands and territories, and claims to political autonomy.
Guatemala’s mining sector is characterized by a lack of transparency and
communities affected by mining development have historically been excluded from
environmental decision-making processes. The private sector and government have by
and large dismissed concerns voiced by affected communities and their claims for
participation and recognition. Then, as communities started to organize and engage in
collective action aimed at demanding their inclusion in environmental decision-making,
the government and the private sector responded with criminalization, the escalation of
force, and violent repression of anti-mining movements. As a result, levels of mining
conflicts are extremely high in Guatemala with intense societal polarization and hostility
between pro-mining and anti-mining groups.
In recent years, scholarly attention has primarily focused on ‘community-level’
responses to extractive projects, increasingly conceptualized as ‘political reactions from
below’ (Li, 2011; Borras & Franco, 2013; Hall et al., 2015). There is a robust literature
that examines how people in Guatemala have reacted - ‘from below’ - to the spread of
extractive projects throughout rural areas in the country (Pedersen, 2013, 2014; Urkidi,
2011; 2017; Fox, 2015; Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2015, 2017). However, less attention
has been afforded to better understanding how political reactions ‘from above’ emerge
and take shape in these contexts38. Governments, corporations and elites shape decisions,
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There is an emerging literature on mobilization against resource extraction that is dedicated to
better understanding how political reactions ‘from above’ emerge and take shape (Cf. Brock &
Dunlap, 2018; Dunlap 2018b; Geenen & Verweijen, 2017). This literature attempts to understand
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practices and interactions that influence political actions ‘from above’ in environmental
conflicts (Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen and Bull, forthcoming). Yet, there is little research
that examines the actual perspectives of these actors on conflicts and opposition to
mining. Elites and corporate actors tend to be ‘blackboxed’ - assumed, acknowledged,
but rarely approached head on. Elsewhere Aguilar-Støen, Bull and I have examined the
dialectic of political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ in environmental conflicts by
analyzing the complex configuration of corporate-government-elite networks and how
these networks operate in response to anti-mining mobilizations (Sveinsdóttir et al.,
forthcoming). In this paper I wish to further substantiate the work on political actions
‘from above’ and ‘from below’ by examining the discourses of business leaders and
economic elites to analyze how the private sector explains and understands mining
conflicts in Guatemala.
The analysis presented in this paper draws on interviews and participant
observation conducted in 2016 and 2017 with corporate representatives and business
leaders, groups and associations that promote private sector interests, as well as the
traditional economic elite, which I will collectively refer to as ‘the private sector’
throughout the paper. I analyze discourses emerging from interviews with these actors, in
which they discussed their thoughts on socio-environmental conflicts and what they see
as the main challenges currently facing the extractive sector in Guatemala. Bull and
Aguilar-Støen (2019) argue that in order to study elite behavior, it is not enough to only
study rational calculations. Rather, we must also study ideas and ideologies that justify
the actions taken by governments, corporations and allied elites to legitimize and actualize their
operations.
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and mobilize joint elite actions. They suggest that we study business discourses to
analyze how business groups explain and understand the country’s development and how
they articulate their own role in such development. I believe that this may also be applied
to studying how the private sector explains and understands mining conflicts. In focusing
on private sector discourses my hope is to advance a better understanding of how
responses to mining opposition emerge and take shape, and the ways in which such
discourses contribute to establishing the conditions of possibility of political action.
In what follows I will start by discussing some methodological considerations
about interviewing elites and ‘studying up.’ In this section I will expand on the fieldwork
and ‘data collection’ that inform the analysis in this paper. Following the methodological
discussion, I will offer some theoretical considerations on how I conceptualize elite
dynamics, why understanding elite discourse matters, and how these are connected and
matter in the context of corporate-community mining conflicts. The fourth section of the
paper delves into the interviews and explores what the private sector sees as some of the
main concerns currently facing extractive industries in the country. The fifth section
discusses the analysis of the key discourses used by the private sector to explain
corporate-community conflicts. Finally, the conclusion is presented.
2. Methodological considerations on interviewing elite actors and ‘studying up’
Increasingly scholars have turned their attention towards the role of elites within
society, which in turn has led to an emerging literature on some of the methodological
challenges of interviewing elites (Harvey, 2010). In researching the multitude of
processes that shape contemporary landscapes of power, it is important to know more
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about, and critically engage with, the people who are most influential in shaping these
processes, along with those affected by them. Often these people of influence occupy
privileged positions in social, economic and political networks and can influence –
formally or informally – decisions and practices with key political, economic, social and
environmental implications (Bull, 2015). Their status means they are often viewed as
belonging to ‘elite’ groups. Although definitions of elites are problematic, and their
precise roles in transforming geographies of power are complex, it is nonetheless clear
that powerful groups of people in influential institutions and organizations are often key
actors in studies that aim to engage critically with the changing character of social,
economic and political worlds (Hughes & Cormode, 1998).
Reflections on research practices of interviewing elites have focused on issues of
power, positionality, and reflexivity within the research process (Dunn, 2007; McDowell,
1998). While these are issues present in all qualitative research, the challenges of
‘studying up’ are viewed somewhat differently than other types of research, with key
themes including issues of access, the dynamics of the interview itself, and the ability to
control the results of the research (Oglesby, 2010). Researchers also find themselves
having to make sense of the numerous friendly encounters – moments marked by
generosity, empathy, or affinity – that disrupts notions of critical distance (Thiem &
Robertson, 2010). Alienation is another concern, as researchers who move amongst
purported adversaries experience risk of being misunderstood by those they frame as
allies (Jansson, 2010). Such stresses accumulate over time, leading Oglesby (2010) to
question the long-term sustainability of any given inquiry. All of these issues challenge
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the notion that it might be less problematic for researchers to critique the powerful than to
produce research on the comparatively ‘powerless’ (Hughes & Cormode, 1998).
2.1. Gaining access and interview dynamics
Issues of access to elite participants are a reoccurring theme throughout the
literature on interviewing elites (Harvey, 2010; Herod, 1999; McDowell, 1998; Mikecz,
2012; Rice, 2010). One of the main challenges associated with gaining access to and
interviewing elites revolves around the unequal power relations that lie in wait for
researchers (Rice, 2010). Whereas in non-elite studies the researchers have the position of
“experts,” in elite studies those who are being studied are “in the know.” Indeed, one of
the reasons that elites are “relatively understudied” is because of their power and ability
to protect themselves from intrusion and criticism (Mikecz, 2012). Gaining access to
elites has to be carefully negotiated, which can be time consuming and costly, and most
elites purposefully erect barriers that set them apart from society (Laurila, 1997; Shenton
& Hayter, 2004; Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2002).
Elite interviews are very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to repeat, so careful
planning is essential. The researcher must negotiate access before the interview and often
has to go through large numbers of gatekeepers to get access to the elites. Yeung (1995)
suggest that researchers should attempt to use as many different avenues as possible in a
polite, yet persistent and opportunistic manner when trying to gain access to elite
participants. Herod (1999) stresses the usefulness of “gate-keepers” and discusses that
being able to use someone’s name or having a letter of introduction, and/or their business
card has given him access to high-level officials in other organizations who might
otherwise have ignored his requests for help. This shows that networking is important,
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since it can help establish a degree of credibility in the eyes of potential interviewees and
provides ready answers to the question “how did you get my name?” (p. 316).
McDowell said that the success of gaining access to elites depends a great deal on
serendipity, social networks as well as particular circumstances (1998, p. 2135). Oglesby
(2010), on the other hand, was surprised by the ease with which she gained access to
sugar industry elites in Guatemala. She speculates that sharing a racial and class
background with mill owners and managers gained her a level of acceptance. Oglesby
also felt that gaining access was sometimes made easier by being a woman; she was
probably not perceived as much of a threat and was perhaps able to be more disarming in
an interview than a man.
2.2. Research and fieldwork in Guatemala
In my own research, gaining access to elite participants was not without issues.
Guatemala’s private sector and business elites are very elusive and given the critical
spotlight under which extractive industries find themselves, elites and corporate actors
are very guarded. However, through several good initial gatekeepers I was able to get the
ball rolling and during fieldwork in 2016 and 2017 I was able to conduct eighteen indepth interviews with business leaders and elites connected to the Guatemalan extractive
sector. The people I interviewed included CEO’s of mining companies, transnational
conglomerates, and agro-industrial organizations, the presidents of the Industrial
Chamber of Guatemala, the Extractive Industries Business Association (GREMIEXT),
and other umbrella organizations promoting private sector interests. I also interviewed the
leaders of industry-led environmental non-profit organizations, as well as past- and
present public servants responsible for state-led conflict resolution in mining conflicts. I
99

also interviewed several members of the traditional Guatemalan economic elite. My
fieldwork also included visits to two different large-scale mining projects: a mineral mine
in the Department of San Marcos, and a cement plant in the Department of Guatemala.
While the mine in San Marcos is now closed and undergoing reclamation, both projects
experienced strong opposition, having seen violent clashes, repression and
criminalization.
My research experience echoes McDowell’s (1998, p. 2135) when she says that a
great deal depends on luck and chance, connections and networks, and the particular
circumstances at the time, as well as a polite, yet persistent and opportunistic manner
when trying to gain access to elite participants. I also strongly relate to the issues raised
by Thiem and Robertson (2010) about having to make sense of the numerous friendly
encounters – moments marked by generosity, empathy, or affinity – that disrupt notions
of critical distance. Many of my interviewees challenged my preconceptions about them.
I also struggled with emotions about moving among these purported adversaries, while
also having strong affinities to the anti-mining movements, perceiving of myself as an
ally to those very movements. Not only did I worry about alienating myself from my
environmental activist friends, I also came to realize that moving between these two
groups could jeopardize the safety of my activist friends. I do not intend for this to be a
paper on methodological reflections. However, given the nature of the ‘data collection
methods’ and the context within which they took place it becomes difficult to separate the
emotional from the empirical and from the analytical – not that I believe that such a
separation can ever really take place.
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3. Conceptualizing elite dynamics and environmental governance in Guatemala
The Guatemalan private sector and business elite remain relatively understudied,
particularly in the context of environmental governance and extractive conflicts. Elites
and corporate actors often feature on the periphery of studies on environmental conflicts
in Guatemala, but then usually as the monolithic perpetrator: the capital owners, the
business and knowledge elites, and the groups controlling the state, thereby contributing
to the marginalization of rural peoples and the overexploitation and degradation of
natural resources (Carruthers, 2008). However, elites are rarely the object of direct
scrutiny in these studies. There are many reasons for this, the most obvious being the
issue of access discussed in the previous section. One may also speculate that in some
instances researchers who align themselves with the causes of marginalized social groups
see elites and corporations as enemies and, as such, shy away from engaging directly with
them. Nevertheless, in recent years both domestic and foreign scholars have increasingly
studied the country’s elite39.
Much of the traditional literature on elites comes from development theory,
focusing particularly on the role elites play in economic growth, industrial upgrading and
institutional change40. However, as Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2015, 2016) point out, much
less attention has been afforded to understanding the complex constellations of elite
39

See e.g. Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen and Bull, 2016; Bull, 2005, 2014, 2015; Bull &
Aguilar-Støen, 2016; Casaús Arzú, 2010; Dosal, 2005; Palencia Prado, 2012; Solano, 2013;
Valdez, 2015.
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See e.g. Amdsen et al., 2012; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Amsden, Di Caprio and Robinson,
2012.
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dynamics and environmental governance.41 While the traditional literature on elites has
mostly been uninterested in environmental governance, the more critical literature on
environmental governance has rarely included elites as the object of direct scrutiny (Bull
& Aguilar-Støen, 2016, p. 142). Through their work on elite dynamics and environmental
governance in Latin America, scholars Aguilar-Støen and Bull (Aguilar-Støen & Bull,
2016; Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2015, 2016b) have started to bridge this gap in the literature.
Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2016) provide new insights into the ways in which elites
exert influence over decisions and practices with environmental implications. They
examine elite shifts throughout Latin America, noting how new elites have emerged, how
old elites continue to influence politics and the economy, and how the relationship
between new and old elites has affected environmental governance. Their findings
illustrate and confirm some of the main problems discussed in the elite literature: how
entrenched elites have hindered structural transformations towards an environmental
governance that ensures more sustainable and equitable development; the conflicts over
land use and how they have their roots in institutions that are kept weak due to historical
control by elites; and how new governments accommodate their politics to the demands
of the elites (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2016b). In the specific context of Guatemala,
Aguilar-Støen and Bull (2016a) have also analyzed the role of the elite as partners,
intermediaries and beneficiaries of the country’s mining sector. Their analysis examines
the linkages between different elites and illustrates how alliances created between the
elite, the military, and the government engender violence in reaction to anti-mining
41

There are some exceptions noted by Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2015, p. 6), e.g., in studies dealing
with international trade regimes or international environmental treaties (see Cashore, 2002; Levy
and Newell, 2002, 2005; McCarthy, 2004)
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mobilizations. Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen and Bull (forthcoming) further expand on this
by analyzing how corporate-government-elite networks in Guatemala mobilize in their
response to anti-mining resistance. Here the authors focus on the interplay between
corporate/state mobilization on the one hand, and anti-mining mobilization on the other,
analyzing how they mutually shape each other.
A main finding advanced by Aguilar-Støen, Bull and Sveinsdóttir is that elites
and elite dynamics impact, in a multitude of ways, practices, decisions, and interactions
that shape how the environment and natural resources are governed. Elites can both
strengthen and undermine institutions and situated practices, whether it be through rent
seeking behavior like lobbying for the lowering of mining royalties, influencing whose
voices get included in public participation and environmental decision-making processes,
or demanding the escalation of enforcement to protect projects experiencing communitylevel opposition.
3.1. Who are the elite in Guatemala?
In Guatemala, business elites are major political actors, through informal
groupings, business associations, think tanks and politcal parties. The disctinction
between their private roles as business leaders and public roles as political advocates is
often blurred, and business leaders not only act individually but also form parts of
powerful families and business groups. Most of the social science literature
conceptualizes them as collectives such as ‘oligrachies’, ‘elite families’, ‘power groups’
or ‘hegemonic blocks’. However, Bull and Aguilar-Støen prefer to use the term ‘business
elites’, but also refer to the organised business elite as ‘private sector’ as this concept is
most used in the public debate, and also by business leaders themselves. (Bull &
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Aguilar-Støen, 2019, p. 122). Guatemala’s business elites and private sector are
organized within a peak business association, the Comité de Asociaciones Agricolas,
Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF), which is the most important economic
entity in Guatemala and a powerful political force. Mining companies are then organized
in the Extractive Industries Business Association (Gremiext), which belongs to the
Industrial Chamber of Guatemala and which forms part of CACIF. (Aguilar-Støen, 2015;
Schneider, 2012).
Guatemala is characterized by the dominance of entrenched elite networks that
have controlled the country’s means of production (land, labor, commercial institutions,
banks and industries) and political system since the colony to the present day (Casaús
Arzú, 2010; Dosal,1995). However, political changes stemming from post-war
democratization and economic restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s have led to shifting
elite dynamics and the emergence of new elites and new factions within the traditional
elite (Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 2016; Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2016a; Sveinsdóttir et al.,
forthcoming). Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2019, p. 134) argue that these shifts must be
understood in the context of three inter-related processes. First, economic changes have
transformed the international and domestic context within which Guatemalan business
groups operate, with new transnational competitors who often control access to markets
and technology entering the fray. Nonetheless, the traditional business elite remained
powerful and adapted to global economic changes by forming alliances with transnational
corporations and by expanding globally and regionally (Bull et al., 2014). With regard to
the extractive industries new transnational actors are dependent on the domestic business
elite, who control important political resources, networks and information without which
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international actors could not operate. As a result the Guatemalan private sector has been
successful in keeping transnational corporations in subordinate positions (Bull et al.,
2014; Schneider, 2012). Second, new business sectors have emerged related to the
privatized state enterprises, non-traditional exports, tourism, the media as well as illegal
and criminal networks. The emergence of these new actors who challenge the dominance
of the traditional elite has resulted in new forms of competition over the control of the
state, e.g., through campaign financing. While in the past the traditional elite (CACIF)
financed electoral campaigns in Guatemala, currently it is estimated that the traditional
private sector provides ca. 25 percent of funding, emerging groups contribute 50 percent
of the funding and the rest is estimated to come from criminal groups, mainly drug
traffickers (CICIG, 2015). Third, elite control over the state apparatus has been
challenged by the ascent of non-elites to power. In Guatemala reforms and demands from
non-elite groups have contributed to transformations, particularly in the justice sector,
where the traditional elite has lost control (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019). However,
despite these shifting elite constellations, Guatemala remains characterized by an
extremely elite dominated system, which is also characterized by institutional corruption
and exclusion. Any analysis of corporate-community conflicts, elite dynamics and
environmental governance in Guatemala must be understood against this backdrop.
3.2. Studying discourses to analyze private sector perspectives and behaviors
Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2019) argue that in order to study elite behavior, it is not
enough to only focus on rational calculations. Rather, we must also study ideas and
ideologies that justify and mobilize collective elite action. They suggest we study private
sector discourse to analyze how business groups explain and understand development and
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how they articulate their own role in such development. I believe that this may also be
applied to studying how the private sector explains and understands mining conflicts. I
follow Bull and Aguilar-Støen’s understanding of discourse as “structures of signification
that allow us to understand the world and give it meaning.” (2019, p. 123). Discourses are
relational and contested fields of power. They are the products of power struggles
through which we naturalize and internalize hegemonic interpretations, but discourses
also where these interpretations are contested and resisted (Dunn and Neumann, 2016).
Discourses represent a cognitive unity that contributes to forming identities. Discourse
theory suggests that the ways in which something is communicated does not necessarily
represent reality in a neutral manner, but can create, change and reconfigure reality
(Philips & Jørgensen, 2002). This is not to suggest that reality does not exist beyond the
discursive, rather, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 108) explain:
“An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense
that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as
objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of
God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field.”
Which discourses become dominant and hegemonic depends on the access that
different actors have to resources and power so that discourses can be comprehended
within a cultural and historical context. This power includes the access that different
actors may have to the means through which narratives and discourses are distributed.
Discourses do not necessarily reflect cause-effect relationships but if they create an
apparent consistency of ideas they can prevail. Discourses contribute to establishing
‘common sense’ (in the Gramscian sense) at given points in time inasmuch as a discourse
is accepted as a frame of reference without major dispute and, as such, discourses
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contribute to establishing conditions of possibility (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019, pp. 123124). In focusing on private sector discourses my hope is to advance a better
understanding of how responses to mining opposition emerge and take shape, and the
ways in which such discourses contribute to establishing the conditions of possibility of
political action.
4. Private sector discourses on corporate-community conflicts and opposition to
mining
This paper sets out to explore and analyze the perspectives of Guatemala’s private
sector on corporate-community conflicts and opposition to extractive industries. In
interviews with the economic elite and business leaders, interviewees were asked about
their thoughts on opposition to extractive projects; what they understand as the
explanations for the emergence of said opposition, as well as their understanding of
environmental conflicts more broadly. The following section analyzes the private sector’s
discourse on what they see as some of the main concerns currently facing extractive
industries in the country: the absence of the state from rural areas where mining activities
generally take place; the presence of NGOs and ‘third-party actors’ with vested interests;
the lack of legal certainty and insecurity surrounding investments; and the lack of
domestic regulation of the ILO Convention 169.
The people interviewed, and whose narratives are examined in the following
sections, included the CEO’s of transnational mining companies, multinational
conglomerates involved in hydropower development, and a leading agro-industrial
organization in the sugar industry. I also interviewed leaders of business associations and
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industrial business networks, as well as board members of umbrella organizations
promoting private sector interests, some of which belong to the traditional Guatemalan
economic elite. I interviewed past- and present public officials who had led institutional
instrument responsible for state-led conflict resolution in mining conflicts, as well as held
roles as private secretary to a president and been members of the Peace Commission
(COPAZ).
4.1. The absence of the state
A key discourse emerging from the interviews was that of state’s role in socioenvironmental conflicts throughout the country. There is a perceived ‘absence of the
state’ from rural areas and an understanding that this absence affects governance and
opposition against extractive industries:
“Entonces lo que tu ves sobre todo en el interior del país en esos territorios indígenas
es una variable y una dimensión que es verdaderamente la causa de mucha de la
problemática de la ingobernabilidad y es la ausencia del Estado.” (Interview #9)
“…so what you see, above all in the interior of the country in these indigenous
territories is a variable [sic] and a dimension that is the true cause of the problem of
lack of governability and the absence of the State.” (Interview#9)
“Y mucha de la conflictividad creo que viene de esa debilidad del estado. Un estado
muy débil, con instituciones débiles, inexistente en ciertas partes del país….”
(Interview #1)
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“…and much of the conflicts I believe come from that weakness from the state. A
very weak state, with weak institutions, non-existent [institutions] in some parts of the
country…” (Interview #1)
Two main narratives emerged within the ‘absence of the state’ logic: first, that
because of this absence, the state fails to provide basic services to the rural population.
As a result, frustrated rural communities turn to the private sector and demand services,
which causes grievances between corporations and communities when the private sector
is unable or unwilling take on the role of the state as service provider:
“Pero está muy complicado, porque también desde la lógica de las comunidades
como el Estado no aparece, no da salud, no da educación, no hay nada, entonces
muchas veces tienen una mentalidad extorsiva a la empresa le tengo que sacar todo lo
que pueda, porque obviamente si viene aquí, tiene dinero, tenemos que aprovechar al
máximo para sacar beneficios, entonces se da esa situación verdad.” (Interview #11)
“But this is very complicated, because from the logic of the communities since the
State does not show up, does not provide health, or education, there is nothing, then
many times they [the communities] have an extortion mind set towards the Company,
I have to extract as much as I can because obviously if they come here, they have
money, we have to get the most out of it to access benefits.” (Interview #11)
“Hay una conflictividad digamos natural, lógica, comprensible, absolutamente porque
ante la ausencia del Estado sobre todo en las comunidades más lejanas de la ciudad
capital digamos, evidentemente estas comunidades lo que quieren ver es en qué
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momento llega a atenderlo, hambre, pobreza extrema, pobreza, falta de salud, falta de
servicios de salud, falta de servicios de educación, una mala calidad de salud, o sea
ante todos estos factores es lógico que ciertas comunidades sientan el deseo de
manifestarse y dar un poco de conflictividad y esa creo que es entendible, es la que se
tiene que atender y es la que también en algunos casos el sector privado sustituye al
gobierno y genera oportunidades para minimizar estos conflictos, eso es
comprensible.” (Interview #5)
“There is a level of conflict that is let’s say, natural, logic, understandable, absolutely
because in the face of the absence of the state, above all in faraway communities,
evidently, these communities what they want is to see when they can access services,
hunger, extreme poverty, poverty, lack of health, lack of health services, lack of
education services, bad quality of health, so, in the face of all these factors it is logical
that some communities feel the desire to manifest themselves and cause some
conflict, and that I think is understandable, that is what we have to take care of, but in
some cases it is the private sector taking the place of the government and that
generates opportunities to minimize conflicts, that is understandable.” (Interview #5)
The second narrative within the ‘absence of the state’ logic was that the
grievances stemming from state absence create room for ‘third-party actors,’ such as
environmental NGOs, to take advantage of community frustrations, manipulating
communities,42 and pitting them against the private sector and the extractive industries:

42

I use ‘communities’ because it is the term used both by the private sector and the anti-mining
movements themselves.
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“Porque prevalece la ausencia del Estado, ha hecho en las comunidades, prevalece
aquello que ¿qué beneficio me van a dar a mí? Tiene que dejarme algo. Entonces la
minería ha sido satanizada pero sobre todo desde fuera, muchos de estos remanentes
del conflicto armado, de los que estuvieron en el verdad, reciben mucho
financiamiento de fuera para el tema minero y la industria minera no fue
precisamente la que mejor se pudo adaptar a las situaciones, de explicar y todo fue
difícil entonces fue satanizada desde un inicio.” (Interview #12)
“Because of the State absence, this has made that in the communities it prevails very
much that [idea of] what is in it for me? They have to give me something. Then
mining has been demonized, above all from outside, much of this is remnants from
the armed conflict, from those who receive funding from foreigner actors for the
mining theme and the mining industry has not been the one to adapt best to those
situations, of explaining, [they were unable to explain well] everything was difficult
and it [mining] was demonized from the start.” (Interview #12)
The private sector grievances regarding the absence of the state seem
contradictory considering the private sector and the business elite have been the driving
force behind the ‘rolling back of the state’ since the 1980s and the 1990s. One
explanation might be that grievances reflect frustrations about a state and society that no
longer corresponds solely to the interests of the business elite. The emergence of new
elite factions, transnational competitors, as well as the traction gained by non-elite actors
and civil society, has resulted in shifting power dynamics and changing opportunity
structures within the state apparatus, which have meant that the traditional business elite
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are no longer the sole power player in Guatemalan society (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019).
A business leader belonging to the traditional economic elite told me: “We believe that in
Guatemala two countries exist, two Guatemalas, but we believe that the second
Guatemala is the one we have made possible” “creemos que en Guatemala existen dos
países, dos Guatemalas pero creemos que la segunda Guatemala es la que nosotros
hemos hecho posible.” The first Guatemala being the poverty-stricken, underdeveloped
Guatemala, the second one, the modern, affluent and business oriented Guatemala, and
they – the private sector – are the ones who created it. ‘We made this country’ one could
read between the lines.
4.2. NGOs, leftist ideology and foreign manipulation
“…las ONGs ambientalistas…pinches negociantes, sin vergüenza…” (Interview #6)
“…environmental NGOs, fucking shameless business…” (Interview #6)
A main concern of the private sector is the presence and influence of ‘third-party
actors’ in lieu of state absence in rural areas. The private sector sees the presence of
environmental NGOs and so called ‘third-party actors’ as one of the main drivers for
conflict and opposition to extractive industries. The perception is that community
opposition only emerges when ‘third-party actors’ with vested financial and political
interests insert themselves into communities to turn them against the companies:
“Generalmente cuando tú te sientas con las comunidades, cuando dialogas con ellos,
cuando te pones de acuerdo las cosas funcionan bien, hasta que aparece un tercero en
discordia, un tercero que en algún momento tiene sus propios intereses también.”
(Interview #11)
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“Generally if you sit down with the communities, when you dialogue with them,
when you reach agreements, thing work well, it is until third parties appear, a third
party who has its own interests too...” (Interview #11)
There seem to be two discourses within the anti-NGO logic: first, the narrative
that environmental NGOs manipulate communities for financial gain; and second, that
foreign countries finance environmental NGOs because of leftist ideologies:
“Entonces comenzaron, como te dije las ONGs salieron, algunas, otras pues ya que
empezaron a conocer el negocio porque es un negocio miserable de verdad.”
(Interview #6)
“Then they started, as I told you, NGOs came forward, some of them, others well,
when they started to understand the business, because it is a miserable business,
truly…” (Interview #6)
“…este tipo de movimientos pseudoambientalistas, que para mí son solo
movimientos que se respaldan en el ambientalismo pero de lo que viven es de generar
conflicto y que en Guatemala siempre exista conflicto patrocinados en algunos casos
por algunos países del extranjero.” (Interview #5)
“That type of pseudo environmental movement, to me they are using
environmentalism as an excuse, but they come here to generate conflict and that in
Guatemala there will always be a conflict sponsored sometimes by some foreign
countries.” (Interview #5)
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“…también creo que hay organizaciones de izquierda que se oponen por una razón
ideológica, ahí es donde amarro eso con toda la historia del conflicto armado y que
eso ayuda como efervescer esa conflictividad.” (Interview#3)
“… I also believe that there are leftist organizations that are against [mining] only for
ideological reasons, that is how I ling that with the history of the armed conflict and
that it helps to fire up that level of conflict.” (Interview#3)
There is a sentiment among some factions of the private sector that leftist
countries manipulate environmental conflicts and fuel opposition against extractive
industries because for ideological reasons. Those who hold to this view seem to view the
Nordic countries, Sweden and Norway in particular, and the Netherlands as the main
culprits. One interviewee encouraged me to be careful because my last name looks
Swedish, and that the Swedes have done much harm to Guatemala – “nos han hecho
mucho daño” – and as such other business leaders might be reluctant to meet with me.
Anti-leftist discourse is of course not new in Guatemala and has its roots in the anticommunist logic of the civil war. Furthermore, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands
all played roles in post-war peace building efforts, some of which included their
development agencies supporting civil society and capacity building of civil society
organizations.
In the context of this perceived manipulation by environmental NGOs and outside
forces the private sector again voiced its discontent with the state for being either unable,
or unwilling, to deal with these actors:
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“Entonces primero tienen un tema de…pero esa parte no es tanto por falta de fuerza
pública es más que todo por falta de certeza jurídica porque el mismo policía le da
miedo trabajar, o sea ejecutar la orden porque cualquier cosa se va a la cárcel el
policía. Si mata a un campesino en defensa propia el que se va al cárcel es el policía,
entonces dices tu: qué onda cómo así? Entonces ese tipo de cosas son las que yo creo,
esa línea gris porque se han fortalecido mucho la otra parte, la parte socialista que
viene de…tu miras a aquí a los embajadores bueno de noruega ya se fue pero a los de
Noruega, a los de Holanda y todos estos países europeos y ponen mucha presión para
que el Estado no ejecute, para que no actúe.” (Interview #7)
“Then first they (who?) have a theme about… but that part is not so much about lack
of public force, it is more about lack of legal certainty because the very police is
afraid of doing their work, that means of executing the orders because policemen are
set in prison for whatever little reason. If they kill a peasant in self-defense the one
who ends up in jail is the policeman, they you say, what? how?. Then that type of
things are things that I believe, that gray line because the other side has been
strengthened, the socialist part that comes from… you see here the ambassadors well
the Norwegian one has left but you see them from Norway, from Holland and all
those European countries putting a lot of press impeding the State to execute, so that
it does not act” (Interview #7)
The private sector’s strong feelings about environmental NGOs and ‘third-party
actors’ must be understood against the backdrop of the civil war, the repercussions of
which reverberate throughout Guatemalan society to this day. Activists are often
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portrayed in similar ways as insurgents during the war, when the figure of the ‘internal
enemy’ was central to normalizing counterinsurgency and genocide:
“Entonces genera un tema ente la realidad del país, entre grupos de interés que
nosotros creemos que viven de esto y que adicional hay un tema político detrás hay
una guerra…que se firmó la paz…pero que nunca fue aceptada y que sigue haciendo
ruido en la sociedad, y eso genera un nivel de conflictividad altísimo. Uno sigue
viendo estos grupos de oposición que al final es hasta la victoria verdad, entonces hay
un tema de problemas por ausencia del estado, de problemas socioeconómicos reales,
de una realidad alterna que cuando se hace un proyecto llega uno a moverla y un tema
político que incentiva todo esto y aprovecha todo esto y ese caldo es el que genera esa
conflictividad.” (Interview #1)
“Then in the face of the country’s reality a theme emerges, between interest groups
we believe live of that and in addition there is a political theme, there is a war
behind… peace was signed… but it was never accepted, and it still makes a lot of
noise in society and that generates a very high level of conflict. One continues to see
this opposition groups that at the end of the day is toward victory, right, then there is
a theme related to problems caused by the absence of the State, real socioeconomic
problems, of an alternative reality that when one launches a project you see it moving
and a political theme that gives incentives to all this and that is the soup where
conflict is cooking” (Interview #1)
The linking of opposition to extractive industries to the rhetoric of the civil war,
invoking the notion of the internal enemy, is used to justify violence and repression
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against environmental activists and social movements. Such an understanding would
indicate that the private sector, at least the more conservative hardliners, are less
interested in resolving conflict through concessions and compromise, but instead opt for
the explicit exclusion and marginalization of opposition (Sveinsdóttir et al., forthcoming).
4.2. Lack of legal certainty and the state’s failure to protect investments
Another main concern among the business elite is what they perceive as a ‘lack of
legal certainty43’ in the judicial system. Judicial insecurity and the state’s failure to
protect investments are seen as one of the greatest threats to the private sector and
economic development in Guatemala:
“en el sector minero e hidroeléctrico, parte de los retos que estamos viviendo es la
falta de certeza jurídica, la falta de reglas claras y algunas decisiones de las cortes que
únicamente que no generan ese tipo de certeza jurídica y estabilidad.” (Interview #5)
“in the mining and hydroelectric sector, part of the challenges we are experiencing is
the lack of legal certainty, the lack of clear rules and some court decisions that do not
build that type of legal certainty and stability” (Interview #5)
Since 2016, the Guatemalan courts have suspended the licenses of at least two
mining projects and two hydropower projects for failure to properly consult affected
communities prior to the installation of the projects (Sveinsdóttir & Aguilar-Støen,
forthcoming). The courts based their decisions on the ILO Convention 169, which
43

Interviewees would talk about ‘falta de certeza jurídica’ or the lack of legal certainty. In law,
‘certeza del derecho’ (legal certainty) represents the requirement that decisions be made
according to legal rules, i.e., be lawful. In short, legal security (‘seguridad jurídica’) is the legal
certainty (‘certeza del derecho’) given to the individual by the State stating that their person,
property and rights will not be violated.
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Guatemala ratified in 1996 and is binding to its signatories, citing the infringement on the
rights of indigenous peoples to prior consultation. This emerging jurisprudence has
become a strong point of contention for the private sector that finds it particularly serious
that licenses are being revoked when companies acted in ‘good faith,’ believing they had
complied with regulatory and legal requirements set forth by the state:
“Para nosotros es ofensivo que una licencia que está firme, que ya se vencieron todos
los plazos para oposición, que existieron todos los plazos para oposición, el Estado
venga y la revierta en función de acciones que el estado debió de haber hecho. Lo que
están diciendo es que mire el ministro cuando dio su licencia no leyó el expediente y
ahora que lo está leyendo dice que debe revocarlo, es tan serio como eso. Estamos
muy preocupados por el futuro.” (Interview #1)
“For us it is an offence that a licence that is firm, that has complied with all the
deadlines for opposition, that all deadlines for opposition existed, the State comes and
reverts it [the licence] due to actions that the State should have taken. What they
[who?] are telling is listen minister when you granted the licence you did not read the
application and now that you are reading it you say you will revoke it, it is as serious
as that. We are very concerned for the future.” (Interview #1)
“En este caso específico de la mina, el Estado…lo que dice el Estado, los tribunales
es que el Estado no hizo la consulta por lo tanto revoca la licencia. Entonces el señor
de esta mina es una víctima, o sea yo pedí una licencia y el estado me la dio y el
Estado dice yo no hice lo que tenía que hacer y la revoco….entonces la posición es
estoy de acuerdo revóquela, pero compense los daños por su falta de efectividad.
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Entonces ese caso en específico es muy dañino para el Estado de Guatemala, dañino
para el país que románticamente se ve como una victoria de grupos que en nuestra
opinión, en mi opinión, no son representativos de las comunidades vecinas al
proyecto si no que son representativas de grupos de oposición sistemática, esa es mi
opinión sobre ese caso específico. Pero el daño no es específicamente a la mina el
daño es el daño que le están haciendo al Estado de Guatemala y al tema de qué va a
pasar en adelante. Un estado en donde no existe seguridad jurídica es un Estado en
donde no se invierte. Ellos lograron su objetivo en que en este país nadie va a invertir
y sin inversión lo que va a ver es pobreza y pobreza peor que la que tenemos.”
(Interview #1)
In the specific case of the mine, the State… what the State says, the courts is that the
State did not conducted consultations therefore the license is revoked. Then the
gentleman from that mine is a victim, I mean I applied for a license and the State gave
it to me and then the State says I did not do what I had to do so I will revoke it… then
the position is I agree revoke it but you need to compensate for the damage caused by
your lack of efficiency. Then that specific case is very harmful for the Guatemalan
State, harmful for the country that romantically sees it as a victory of groups that in
our opinion, in my opinion do not represent neighboring communities they rather
represent systematic opposition groups, that is my opinion on that specific case (what
case?). But the harm is not specific to the mine, it is a harm done to the Guatemalan
state and what is going to happen in the future. A Sate in which legal certainty does
not exist is a State that does not attract investments. They [who?] reach their objective
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that is nobody will invest in this country and without investments what we will have
is poverty and a type of poverty that is worse than the one we have.” (Interview #1)
Because of the recent suspensions of two major mining projects, El Tambor in
2016 and El Escobal in 2017, many of the interviewees voiced concerns that mining is no
longer a viable industry in Guatemala:
“Básicamente con el tema de la Puya, la minería está acabada porque nadie va a creer
en una licencia de un Estado que las revoca después que las otorgó, después que el
proyecto está terminado. El problema es que me otorgan una licencia, me dejan
terminar el proyecto y ahí revocan la licencia. Es un tema de seguridad jurídica
terrible pero ese la realidad que estamos viviendo. Entonces la minería se va a
acabar…” (Interview #1)
“Basically with the theme of La Puya, mining is going to end because nobody will
have faith in a lisence from a state that revokes the lisence after granting it, after the
Project has ended. The problem is that they grant me a lisence, they let me finish the
project and then they revoke the lisence. It is a terrible theme of legal certainty, but
this is the reality we experience. Then mining is going to end…” (Interview #1)
The discourse surrounding the lack of legal certainty must be understood in the
context of how anti-mining movements are increasingly successful in mobilizing the law
in their struggles. Much of what the private sector understands as judicial insecurity
reflects the innovative ways environmental activists use legal strategies to challenge their
exclusion from environmental decision-making arenas. They have done so by generating
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grassroots driven forms of governance practices, such as community referendums, which
Guatemalan courts have increasingly started to recognize as legally binding, a result of
which have been the suspensions of mining and hydropower projects.
4.3. The ILO Convention 169 and the principle of prior consultation
Much of the contention surrounding legal uncertainty and the state’s failure to
protect investments revolves around the ILO Convention 169, indigenous peoples right to
prior consultation, and public participation in environmental decision-making processes
more broadly. The private sector argues that Convention is being manipulated by
environmental NGOs and again laments the states inability to do its job:
“Y un tema que los une a los dos es el Convenio 169 de la OIT que lamentablemente
por más de 20 años el Estado no lo ha sabido reglamentar y eso se ha vuelto un foco
de conflictividad ahora porque por decisiones, a nuestro juicio, poco certeras de las
cortes a veces por desconocimiento de algunos magistrados están cancelando. Y ahí
es donde no entendemos, ¿cómo la corte de Constitucionalidad cuando ya había
dictaminado ahora determina totalmente lo contrario?, la Corte Suprema también. Y
segundo partiendo que la responsabilidad de las consultas es una responsabilidad del
Estado no de las empresas, el hecho de que no sea reglamentado no quiere decir que
las consultas que se hagan haya que repetirlas y si hay que repetirlas ok, se repiten
pero no cerrando las operaciones de las empresas.” (Interview #5)
“And a theme that joins both [both what?] is the ILO 169 convention from the OIT
that unfortunately the State has not known how to make rules and that has become a
point of conflict because now, due to decision, in our judgment bad decisions from
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the courts, sometimes due to lack of knowledge of some judges they are cancelling.
And there is where we do not understand, how is it possible that the constitutional
court once it has ruled in one direction now rules in the opposite direction? The
supreme court as well. And second departing from the responsibility of the
consultations it is a responsibility of the State not of the business, the fact that there
are no rules does not mean that consultations that were conducted should be
conducted again, if we have to do it again, that is ok but we do them again, the
solution is not to cancel the operations of the projects.” (Interview #5)
“El Convenio en los últimos cinco años ha sido utilizado digamos básicamente por
grupos, porque no son las poblaciones per se si no son los defensores o los llamados
defensores de los pueblos indígenas quienes han utilizada esto como una plataforma
legal en oposición a minerías, hidroeléctricas, el caso de la palma africana no lo
pueden hacer porque no son inversiones promovidas por el Estado digamos, son
inversiones privadas cien por ciento o como el azúcar por ejemplo pero cuando hay
de por medio una medida a nivel del Estado entonces es obligatorio hacer esos
procesos de consulta, entonces eso ha creado muchísimos problema, ha creado
muchísimo desgaste y hoy diría yo que estamos empantanados con ese tipo de cosas.
Así que ese es otro gran reto, pensando en cómo se va a poder implementar el
Convenio 169 a futuro y que ese realmente se convierta en un convenio de beneficio
para las poblaciones. Que atraiga inversión, que atraiga desarrollo, que sin molestar la
cultura, sin asimilar a las poblaciones pero que de alguna manera ellos sean sujetos de
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derechos humanos como el resto pero también del progreso, así que ese te diría yo
que es otro gran reto que tenemos como sector.” (Interview #11)
The convention has been used for the last five years basically by groups, because it is
not the populations per se but the defenders or so-called defenders of indigenous
peoples who have used this as a legal platform to oppose mining, hydroelectric, the
case of African Palm they cannot do it because these are not investments promoted by
the State let’s say,, they are private investments one hundred per cent or like
sugarcane for example but when there is an internation on the State level then it is
mandatory to conduct the consultations, then this has caused a lot of problems, this
has created a lot of worn out y today I would say that we are mudded with that type of
things. So this is a huge challenge, thinking about how to implement the Convention
169 in the future and that it becomes a convention that will benefit the populations.
That attracts investments, that attracts development without disturbing culture,
without assimilating populations, but that in a way they become human rights
subjects as everybody else but also of progress, so I would say to you that this is
another huge challenge we have as a sector.” (Interview #11)
The emerging jurisprudence in Guatemala, which acknowledges the right of
indigenous peoples to prior consultation, is vehemently contested by the private sector,
which argues that the Convention is not being applied correctly and needs to be
regulated. ‘Prior consultation’ remains an unsettled and contested legal concept and there
is no agreement about how the principle of prior consultation should be upheld in
practice. However, the Constitutional Court has also declared that lack of internal
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legislation on the ILO Convention and the principle of prior consultation “cannot lead to
this right being nullified44.” Furthermore, indigenous movements in Guatemala have
clearly stated that the fundamental issue at hand, from their perspective, is not the
realization of prior consultation or their regulation. Rather, the issue is that the state must
respect the political autonomy of indigenous people to carry out referendums through
their own procedures, with cultural relevance and in the language spoken by the
community, and without any type of coercion towards the community. As such, they
argue, the state must respect the outcomes of the over 100 community referendums
carried out in Guatemala so far (Xiloj, 2016)
However, the private sector believes that the Convention is being manipulated by
environmental NGOs and in July 2019, CACIF petitioned the ILO to intervene in
Guatemala. CACIF and the private sector claim that recent unfavorable court rulings
undermine legal certainty and infringe on the right to freedom enterprise and work,
generating social conflict (Bolaños & Gramajo, 2017). The private sector has also denied
the existence of indigenous peoples in areas affected by extractive projects in an attempt
to negate the need for prior consultation as prescribed by the ILO Convention. In 2017,
following the Court’s decision to suspend the licenses of the Escobal mine, the private
sector made statements denying the existence of the Xinka people, either outright or in
the areas surrounding the mine. The then president of CACIF was quoted saying that the
Court’s resolution was based on a “non-existent community” and that the court’s findings
were false (Prensa Libre, 2017). Following this the Court ruled that an anthropological
study be undertaken in the area to determine whether the Xinka ‘really exist.’ In
44
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September 2018, the Court ruled that there are indeed Xinka people in the areas
surrounding the mine and that the Xinka people’s rights to prior consultation had been
violated. As such the mine remains suspended, currently awaiting the results of whatever
consultation takes place.
The private sector is primarily concerned with who should be responsible for
consultations. Currently, with respect to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, it
would seem that the state is responsible for facilitating prior consultations as prescribe by
the ILO Convention 169. However, in 2013, the Constitutional Court recognized for the
first time the results of a community-organized referendum on mining as binding, thus
establishing a jurisprudence that acknowledges ‘the people’s right to be consulted’ and
that the right to organize such referendums resides with municipalities and communities
(Sveinsdóttir and Aguilar-Støen, forthcoming).
5. Discussion
Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2019) argue that to understand elite behavior we must
study the ideas and ideologies that justify and mobilize joint elite actions. This following
section presents a discussion of the key discourses of how the private sector explains and
understands corporate-community conflicts surrounding mining.
5.1. Absence of the state from rural areas
A key discourse of the private sector surrounds the role of the state in mining
conflicts and how the ‘absence of the state’ from rural areas affects corporate-community
relationships. The discourses of the private sector and the business elite have most
commonly considered development and economic growth to be dependent on roll back of
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the state and the freeing of markets. However, as pointed out by Bull and Aguilar-Støen
(2019), gradually, a stronger focus on institutions and social dialogue has evolved in the
discourse of the elite. There are several factors that might explain this discursive shift:
economic changes have transformed the domestic and international context in which
Guatemalan business groups operate; and the emergence of new elite factions and
transnational competitors, as well as the traction gained by non-elite actors and civil
society, has resulted in shifting power dynamics and changing opportunity structures
within the state apparatus, which have meant that the traditional business elite are no
longer the sole power player in Guatemalan society.
5.2. NGOs, third-party actors and foreign influence
Another discourse of the private sector understands the presence of environmental
NGOs and so called ‘third-party actors’ as a driving factor in corporate-community
conflicts around mining. The private sector explains that community opposition stems
from the interference of ‘third-party actors’ with vested financial and political interests,
and who turn communities against the companies. Rural communities are often perceived
of as lacking in agency and being malleable to outside manipulation. During the armed
conflict, the conservative right-wing accused the rural population and indigenous people
of being ‘engañados’ – fooled and manipulated – by outside forces (McAllister & Nelson,
2013).
There is a sentiment among some factions of the private sector that leftist
countries manipulate environmental conflicts for ideological reasons. They view the
Nordic countries, Sweden and Norway in particular, and the Netherlands as the main
culprits. Anti-leftist discourse in Guatemala and has its roots in the anti-communist logic
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of the civil war. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands all played roles in post-war
peace building efforts, some of which included their development agencies supporting
civil society and capacity building of civil society organizations.
The private sector’s strong feelings about environmental NGOs and ‘third-party
actors’ must be understood against the backdrop of the civil war, the repercussions of
which reverberate throughout Guatemalan society to this day. Activists are often
portrayed in similar ways as insurgents during the war, when the figure of the ‘internal
enemy’ was central to normalizing counterinsurgency and genocide. The linking of antimining movements to the rhetoric of the civil war, invoking the notion of the internal
enemy, is used to justify violence and repression against environmental activists and
social movements. Such an understanding would indicate that the private sector, at least
the more conservative hardliners, are less interested in resolving conflict through
concessions and compromise, but instead opt for the explicit exclusion and
marginalization of opposition (Sveinsdóttir et al., forthcoming).
5.3. Lack of legal certainty and the ILO Convention 169
The discourse surrounding the lack of legal certainty must be understood in the
context of how anti-mining movements are increasingly successful in mobilizing the law
in their struggles. Much of what the private sector understands as judicial insecurity
reflects the innovative ways environmental activists use legal strategies to challenge their
exclusion from environmental decision-making arenas. They have done so by generating
grassroots driven forms of governance practices, such as community referendums, which
Guatemalan courts have increasingly started to recognize as legally binding, a result of
which have been the suspensions of mining and hydropower projects.
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Much of the discourse surrounding legal uncertainty and the state’s failure to
protect investments surrounds the ILO Convention 169. The emerging jurisprudence in
Guatemala, which acknowledges the right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation, is
vehemently contested by the private sector, which argues that the Convention is being
manipulated by environmental NGOs and needs to be regulated. However, more broadly,
these discourses can be understood as relating to indigenous peoples right to prior
consultation and who gets included in environmental decision-making processes.
6. Conclusion
This paper set out to explore the discourses of Guatemalan business leaders and
economic elites to analyze how the private sector explains and understands corporatecommunity mining conflicts in the country. In doing so, my aim is to contribute to
ongoing discussions about how the private sector affects environmental governance and
shapes the conditions of possibility of political action in environmental conflicts
(Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 2016; Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2015, 2016a,
2019; Sveinsdóttir et al., forthcoming). Elites and corporations’ impact, in a multitude of
ways, practices, decisions, and interactions that shape environmental governance. Elites
can both strengthen and undermine institutions and situated practices, whether it be
through rent seeking behavior like lobbying for the lowering of mining royalties,
influencing whose voices get included in (or excluded from) public participation and
environmental decision-making processes, or demanding the escalation of enforcement to
protect projects experiencing opposition. In the past, entrenched elites have hindered
structural transformations towards environmental governance that ensures more
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sustainable and equitable development, and mining conflicts often have their roots in
institutions that are kept weak due to historical control by elites (Bull and Aguilar-Støen,
2016b).
An analysis of how the private sector explains and understands corporatecommunity mining conflicts reveales that the private sector is increasingly concerned
about the role of the state, institutions and the law in environmental governance. The
discourses around these concerns were articulated as the ‘absence of the state’ from rural
areas; the lack of legal certainty and the state’s failure to protect investments; and the
ILO Convention 169 and the principle of prior consultation. These concerns must be
understood in the context of several interrelated processes. First, changing opportunity
structures and shifting power dynamics have resulted in the emergence of new elite
factions and transnational competitors, as well as considerable advances made by nonelite actors and civil society, which means that the business elite are no longer the sole
power player in competing for control of the state apparatus. Second, the discourse of
‘lack of legal certainty’ reflects demands for more just environmental governance and
anti-mining movements increasing success in mobilizing the law in their opposition to
extractive industries. Third, the discourse on the ILO Convention 169 and its lack or
regulation must be understood in the context of an emerging jurisprudence that
acknowledges the right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation. Finally, the discourse
of interference by environmental NGOs and ‘third-party actors’ has to be understood
against the backdrop of the civil war and the ways in which its repercussions continue to
reverberate throughout Guatemalan society.
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However, more broadly, these discourses can be understood as a reflection of
struggles over who gets to make decisions about the environment and at what scales.
Those who resist extractive industries in Guatemala – most commonly the rural poor and
indigenous people - demand access to environmental decision-making arenas, using an
array of formal and informal strategies to pry open the political spaces they have
historically been excluded from. These actors challenge dominant and hegemonic ideas
about participation, about what constitutes as appropriate human-environment relations,
and about how the state works and for whom. These conflicting and contradictory notions
surrounding corporate-community conflicts are reflected in the discourses of the private
sector, which appears to remain resistant to ideas about more inclusive environmental
governance. It is evident, even as the private sector emphasizes the role of institutions
and the role of law in environmental governance, that the practices of the most powerful
members of the elite have changed little. The private sector continues to be linked to
illegal financing of political campaigns of (allegedly) corrupt politicians. The killings of
human rights defenders, and environmental and indigenous rights activist, continue to
rise, and the military has once again strengthened its position within the state apparatus
(Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019, p. 134).
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Chapter six: Conclusion
In the dissertation I focus my analytical gaze on corporate-community conflicts
around extractive industries in Guatemala to examine the ways in which environmental
struggles emerge and take shape. I use environmental governance as a framework to
analyze the processes, institutions, actors, discourses that shape the conditions of
possibility of political action and mobilization in environmental struggles. I argue that to
understand the conditions of possibility of political action and mobilization in
environmental struggles we must study the interplay between political actions ‘from
above’ and ‘from below,’ which I see as dialectically interrelated, with dynamic and
contested interactions between actors within and between scales. Environmental struggles
are part of emergent forms of scalar politics wherein different actors struggle to
(re)consolidate power and authority in the hands of competing groups. The complex ways
in which corporate-elite-government-military networks shape political actions in
environmental conflicts intersects with the strategies of grassroots movements, who
themselves are engaged in multi-scalar contentious politics. Spatialities shape the
conditions of possibility for political action. They matter for the imaginaries, material
practices and emergent trajectories of environmental struggles. By examining the shifting
spatialities of political actions we can reveal the articulations of emergent power relations
and make visible some of the power geometries in environmental struggles.
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Paul Robbins (2004) said that to understand uneven development, unjust social
relations, and socio-ecological distribution conflicts, we must ground these processes
historically and geographically by tracing the historical processes, legal and institutional
infrastructures, and socially implicated assumptions and discourses that typically make
unjust outcomes the rule rather than the exception, which is precisely what I have tried to
do in this dissertation.
1. Summary of main findings and arguments
The first article, “This is not a game”: Shaping political actions ‘from above’ in
environmental conflicts in Guatemala, examined the interplay between political actions
from above and below in extractive conflicts. In the paper, we analyse how the private
sector and the government respond to opposition against extractive industries. Responses
include tactics and strategies that range from criminalisation and violent repression of
activism to publicity campaigns and lobbying. However, we observe that the ways in
which social movements resist also influence responses ‘from above,’ e.g. legal and
technical contestations to environmental and social standards, community referendums,
civil disobedience etc.
We contend that the private sector and government engage in practices that aim to
undermine and suppress opposition to extractive industries, and to make extractive
operations politically and socially legitimate. Activists are increasingly portrayed in the
same way as adversaries during the civil war, justifying counterinsurgency and repression
against them, while paradoxically, corporations claim commitment to international
human rights standards, such as the ILO’s Convention 169, and to engage in ‘community
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development’ and ‘social responsibility.’ The frequent use of violence in response to
mining opposition suggest that the private sector and the government are less interested
in neutralizing resistance through concessions and forms of compromise, but instead opt
for the explicit exclusion and marginalization of oppositional forces by various
mechanisms ranging from discursive and legal structures to outright violence and
repression.
The second article, From the streets to the courts: Mobilizing the law to subvert
hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles, examines the growing importance
of law, legal institutions and legal actors in anti-mining struggles, analyzing both why
and how environmental activists mobilize through ‘legal’ forms of political action. We
find that people affected by mining related environmental injustices resist their exclusion
from environmental decision-making by creating ‘hybrid mechanisms for participation’,
such as community consultations, and by challenging dominant notions of ‘participation’
through their contestation of EIAs and technocratic, market-driven ideas about FPIC.
In analyzing the evolving political actions of anti-mining movements, we find that
environmental activists challenge dominant notions of ‘participation’ through their
contestations of technocratic EIAs and market-driven ideas about FPIC. They do so to
obtain recognition and to assert the rights of affected communities to self-determination
in environmental decision-making processes, and to unsettle the legitimacy of dominant
ideas about development and human-environment relations. One of the most powerful
ways in which environmental activists are able to challenge their exclusion from
environmental decision-making arenas is by generating grassroots driven forms of
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governance practices, such as community referendums, which have become one of the
most common tools for resisting mining development in Guatemala.
The third article, Corporate community conflicts in Guatemala: Exploring private
sector perspectives on opposition to mining, explored the discourses of Guatemalan
business leaders and economic elites in order to analyze how the private sector explains
and understands corporate-community mining conflicts in the country.
An analysis of how the private sector explains and understands corporatecommunity mining conflicts reveals that the private sector is increasingly concerned
about the role of the state, institutions and the law in environmental governance, as well
as the interference of environmental NGOs and ‘third-party actors.’
The discourse of the private sector should be understood in the context of
emergent forms of scalar politics where different actors struggle to consolidate power and
authority in the hands of competing groups. Those who resist extractive industries in
Guatemala – most commonly the rural poor and indigenous people - demand access to
environmental decision-making arenas, using an array of formal and informal strategies
to pry open the political spaces they have historically been excluded from. These actors
challenge dominant and hegemonic ideas about participation, about what constitutes as
appropriate human-environment relations, and about how the state works and for whom.
These conflicting and contradictory notions surrounding corporate-community conflicts
are reflected in the discourses of the private sector, which appears to remain resistant to
ideas about more inclusive environmental governance
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2. Future research and final remarks
There is so much more that I would have liked to include in this dissertation, but
cannot – because of time, space, my sanity. There is so much more to be said about
environmental struggles in Guatemala, and this dissertation offers only the tiniest of
glimpses into an incredibly complicated, multifaceted situation.
The articles in this dissertation are just a starting point. At a later point in time I
would like to write another paper that builds on the framework laid out in the second
article of this dissertation - From the streets to the courts: Mobilizing the law to subvert
hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles. One of the main findings in that
article is the context of criminalization, repression and violence that arises with the
emergence of community consultations or ‘hybrid mechanisms for participation.’ To
further substantiate this finding empirically I would like to examine the extraordinary
escalation measures taken by the state and the private sector in attempts to hinder
consultation processes from taking place in the Departments of Santa Rosa and Jalapa.
Such a paper would also further substantiate the findings of the first paper in my
dissertation - “This is not a game”: Shaping political actions ‘from above’ in
environmental conflicts in Guatemala – to further emphasize that these processes of
ongoing contestations about environmental governance reflect emergent scalar politics
about who gets to make decisions about the environment.
There are several avenues that I wish to pursue in my future research. I intend to
continue my engagement with research on socio-environmental conflicts in Guatemala
and Central America. I think that it may be particularly interesting to continue examining
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the interplay between legal arenas and environmental contestations from a political
ecology perspective. In studying environmental struggles, political ecology as a field,
with its focus on informal and extra-legal dynamics, has paid far too little attention to
legal geographies that are central to environmental conflicts in many places. I wish to
address these lacunae by further developing my research on the judicialization of
environmental struggles, in Central America, as well as in other parts of the Global South
and the Global North.
I am also very interested in expanding my future research to include research on
the political ecologies of environmental struggles and resource extraction in North
America, and ultimately adding a comparative component to my current research. I am
particularly interested in exploring the environmental politics of pipeline development
and energy infrastructure in the United States and Canada, for example examining the
social and environmental impacts of projects like the Dakota Access Pipeline, the
Keystone Pipeline System and the Enbridge Pipeline. I recall following the conflict
surrounding the Dakota Access Pipeline as it was unfolding in 2016 and being taken
aback by many of the parallels with what I have observed in Guatemala. This sparked an
interest in expanding my future research to include research on the politics of
environmental struggles and resource extraction in North America.
One thing I am sure of: wherever the future takes me, Guatemala will always be
with me. Guatemala – Iximulew – país de eterna primavera, you have touched me to the
very core of my soul and for that I will always be grateful.
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